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ABSTRACT 
This theoretical thesis traces two paradigmatic shifts currently transforming psychodynamic 
theory and practice: the shift from a one-person to a two-person psychology and the shift from 
conscious cognition to unconscious embodied affect.  These two shifts support a 
phenomenological understanding of the clinical encounter as inherently intersubjective and 
embodied.  The concept of embodied intersubjectivity is explored by weaving together relevant 
literature from the fields of relational psychoanalysis, interpersonal neurobiology, contemporary 
developmental psychology, and body psychotherapy.  The view is offered that, for some clients 
more than others, developing a deeper connection with one’s embodied sense of self, and having 
that experience recognized in a somatic third space by another embodied subject, is one factor 
that may contribute to client change.  By resonating in a state of embodied recognition both 
client and therapist come into contact with a felt sense of true self-experience.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
“People say that what we’re all seeking is a meaning for life. I don’t think that’s what we’re 
really seeking. I think that what we’re seeking is an experience of being alive, so that our life 
experiences on the purely physical plane will have resonances with our own innermost being and 
reality, so that we actually feel the rapture of being alive.”  
– Joseph Campbell (1991, p. 1) 
 
Two paradigmatic and interrelated shifts in psychotherapy have unfolded over the last 
few decades.  The first shift is from a one-person to a two-person psychology.  This shift 
highlights the intersubjective context of human development and clinical work. The second shift 
is from a focus on cognition towards a focus on affect; embodied emotion.  This theoretical study 
seeks to explore how the intersection of these two shifts is currently transforming clinical theory 
and practice.   Both of these shifts have to do with a move away from the Cartesian mind, 
isolated from other minds and split from the body, and toward a conceptualization of an 
intersubjective bodymind.  The clinical encounter can now be contextualized as taking place 
within an embodied intersubjective matrix: the space within which two bodyminds interact 
through non-verbal, implicit, bodily-based, affective communication. The process that facilitates 
change in psychotherapy is increasingly being understood as intrinsically intersubjective and 
embodied.   
How This Study Came to Be  
This past fall I came across the work of the psychoanalyst Emmanuel Ghent (1989, 1990) 
and was deeply stirred by his writings.  In his seminar at the Postdoctoral Program in 
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Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis at New York University, Ghent assigned analytic candidates 
the task of writing down as much as they knew about the theoretical beliefs that guided their 
practice, repeating the exercise at the end of the course.  Ghent (1989) titled his own attempt at 
such a daunting task: Credo – The Dialectics of One-Person and Two-Person Psychologies.  In 
explaining his use of the term “credo” Ghent suggests that belief plays a central role in the field 
of psychotherapy where “hard facts are hard to come by” and where “every analyst theorizes, 
indeed thinks and practices on the basis of a belief system or credo” (p. 169).  Other 
psychoanalysts including Benjamin (2005), Bromberg (2012), and Lichtenberg (2014) among 
others, took Ghent’s credo, his expression of his personal belief system, as an invitation to write 
their own.  Reading these papers led me to think about what theoretical beliefs guide my clinical 
practice as I embark on a professional path as a clinical social worker.   I found myself returning 
again and again to the same questions: What do I believe is transformative about psychotherapy? 
What do I believe brings about change in the client - and the therapist?   
As I mulled over the aforementioned questions I thought about my own experience as a 
client in psychodynamic psychotherapy.  Perhaps this is because, at this point in my career, I 
have spent more time “on the couch” as opposed to “in the chair.”  However, I believe that even 
seasoned therapists’ belief systems are not only formed through education and practice but are 
also highly influenced by their personal experiences as clients.  Over the course of my personal 
experience as a client in psychotherapy, I have noticed a distinct difference between cognitively 
understanding a specific insight and feeling it to be true in my body.  I have had “aha” moments 
in which, through the process of meaning-making, I have gained insight and/or developed greater 
acceptance of previously unconscious thoughts or feelings.  I have found, however, that although 
meaning-making, or intellectual insight, helps to develop deeper self-awareness, it does not 
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always lead to significant changes in how I feel or how I function.  In other words, insight alone 
is not enough.  When meaning-making is paired with a bodily-based felt sense, a knowing in my 
bones - and when both these experiences are shared with my therapist in a co-created 
relationship - it is then that I perceive an organic change in how I feel and how I function.  My 
desire to better understand this experience in my own therapy led me down the ensuing path of 
research and study. 
Mitchell and Black (1995) conclude their book, Freud And Beyond: A History of Modern 
Psychoanalytic Thought with the following sentence: “Clinical psychoanalysis is most 
fundamentally about people and their difficulties in living, about a relationship that is committed 
to deeper self-understanding, a richer sense of personal meaning, and a greater degree of 
freedom” (p. 253).  I believe that when deeper self-understanding, a richer sense of personal 
meaning, and a greater degree of freedom are developed, both through symbolic language and 
embodied experience, and both within the self and in relationship with another, what we gain is 
the ability to more deeply feel, as Campbell articulates in the opening quote of this chapter, “the 
rapture of being alive.”  In other words, we engage in a therapeutic relationship dedicated to a 
deeper more meaningful experience of self, on both a symbolic and embodied level, with the 
hope of coming into contact with a more enlivened state of being.    
The Shifting Paradigm of Clinical Context 
 
In his plenary address at the American Psychological Association’s 2009 annual 
convention, Allen Schore described the field of psychology in the latter half of the 20th century 
as shifting from a behavioral paradigm to a cognitive paradigm, and most recently towards an 
emotional paradigm.  According to Kuhn (1962), the nature of a paradigm shift is change that 
occurs across interdisciplinary fields of study.  A. N. Schore (2009b) suggests that we are now in 
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the midst of a paradigm shift sparked by increased communication and interdisciplinary study 
across the fields of neurobiology, psychology, psychiatry, and biology.  A. N. Schore (2012) 
describes a changing focus in theory and research “from left brain conscious cognition to right 
brain unconscious affect” (p. 3).  It is a shift from the explicit, verbal, rational domain to the 
implicit, integrative, nonverbal, bodily-based emotional domain (A. N. Schore, 2009b).   
Paralleling this shift from cognition to emotion, the field of relational psychoanalysis, 
influencing the broader field of psychodynamic psychotherapy, has undergone a shift from a 
one-person to a two-person psychology.  No longer is the therapeutic process conceptualized as 
taking place within an individual or between a subject and an object, but rather between two 
subjectivities (Benjamin, 1990, p. 184).  A. N. Schore (2012), in his discussion of the 
corresponding paradigm shift currently taking place in relational psychotherapy, cites Bromberg 
(2012):  
Interpersonal and Relational writers largely have endorsed the idea that we are in fact 
confronted with a paradigm change and have conceptualized it as a transformation from a 
one-person to a two-person psychology.  I feel that this formulation is accurate, and that 
three central clinical shifts are intrinsic to the conceptual shift: A shift from the primacy 
of content to the primacy of context, a shift from the primacy of cognition to the primacy 
of affect, and a shift away from (but not yet an abandonment of) the concept of 
“technique.” (p. 126) 
Along with the paradigm shifts discussed above, influenced by research in the 
neurosciences, an interest in the body has re-emerged in psychodynamic discourse (see Aron, L. 
& Anderson, F.S., 1998; Anderson, F. S. 2008; Corrigall, J., Payne, H., & Wilkinson, H., 2006; 
Marks-Tarlow, 2012; Fogel, A., 2009 and others).  What body psychotherapists have long 
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known, mainly that it is not only two minds interacting in the intersubjective matrix of clinical 
practice but also two bodies, is now being incorporated into mainstream psychodynamic theory 
and practice.  A. N. Schore emphatically states: “psychotherapy involves changes not in the 
cognitions of the patient’s human mind/brain machine but in the affective embodied experiences 
of his or her brain/mind/body” (2012, p. 12).  Somatic, embodied awareness is now becoming 
widely recognized as a valuable and under-explored tool in clinical practice.  
Embodied Intersubjectivity  
In this theoretical study I will explore the phenomenon of embodied intersubjectivity, 
which is abstruse in nature and difficult to grasp, by weaving together relevant literature from the 
fields of intersubjective relational theory, interpersonal neurobiology, contemporary 
developmental psychology, and body psychotherapy.  Over the last two decades, research from 
developmental psychology and the neurosciences has redefined our understanding of the 
interconnectedness of body, mind, brain, and relationships.  Much of this research is consonant 
with the intersubjective perspective of relational psychoanalysis.   
The subject of this thesis is not the materialistic or physical body, but rather the 
intersubjective, experiential body.  I will explore what Fogel (2009) refers to as embodied self-
awareness and what Gendlin (1996) refers to as the felt sense - the capacity to feel or sense 
emotional meaning in the body (Wilberg, 2003).  Further, I will examine how the felt sense is 
created and moves within and between two bodies in the intersubjective third space, and how this 
process contributes to healing in the therapeutic encounter.  I will argue that part of what is 
transformative about psychotherapy is developing or increasing a felt sense of oneself, an 
embodied self-awareness, through the process of mutual recognition with another embodied 
being. 
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Relational psychoanalysis contends that in psychotherapy we learn to have a deeper 
relationship with ourselves through the process of being in relationship with another.  I will take 
this perspective one step further and argue that part of what is transformative in psychotherapy is 
experiencing a deeper embodied relationship with ourselves through the process of being in 
relationship with another embodied being.  I would like to emphasize that by no means am I 
suggesting that embodied experience is more significant than symbolic meaning-making: as 
opposed to being in competition with one another, these two therapeutic factors are 
complementary (BCSPG, 1998b, p. 904).  Rather, I would like to suggest that, for some clients 
more than others, a deeper experience of embodied self-awareness, developed through the 
process of engaging in an embodied relationship with another, is one of many factors that may 
contribute to the transformative nature of psychotherapy.  
A greater understanding of the nature of embodied intersubjectivity on the part of the 
therapist has the capacity to contribute to clinical practice in a number of significant ways.  This 
theoretical study is primarily concerned with the following three.  First, by tuning into her 
embodied felt sense of the present moment, a wealth of information lurking below the surface of 
verbal, analytic, explicit communication becomes available to the therapist.  Equipped with this 
information she can better analyze and make sense of the client’s experience.  Second, working 
on an embodied intersubjective level creates a space within which the client has the opportunity 
to deepen his own felt bodily sense of self, an experience that can be healing in its own right.  
Third, the therapist’s awareness of the embodied intersubjective space, moving both within and 
between client and therapist, allows the therapist to communicate with the client on a bodily-
based level, thus introducing the possibility of shared affective regulation and the exchange of 
mutual embodied recognition.  
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Relevance to Clinical Social Work 
 
An integrative, person-in-environment, biopsychosocial approach is the hallmark of 
clinical social work.  At its core, clinical social work is a holistic practice in that it considers the 
whole person from an ecological perspective.  Implicit in the biopsychosocial approach is the 
interconnectedness of body-mind-brain, the relational environment, and the socio/cultural 
environment within which the body-mind-brain develops and exists.  Thus, the field of clinical 
social work is positioned to be at the forefront of the integration and application of research from 
a variety of fields that highlight the relevance of an embodied intersubjective approach in clinical 
practice. 
According to the National Association of Social Work’s (2005) Standards for Clinical 
Social Work in Social Work Practice, clinical social workers now constitute the largest 
population of mental health providers in the nation.  Any clinical interaction between two or 
more people can be enhanced by a deeper awareness of how we relate on a bodily-based 
intersubjective level.  Thus, the subject matter of this theoretical study is applicable on a wide 
scale across a variety of professional social work settings and a variety of therapeutic techniques.   
Common factors research, based on meta-analytic studies, focuses on identifying the 
effective “common ingredients” shared by diverse psychotherapeutic orientations (Norcross & 
Grencavage, 1989).  While supporting the efficacy of psychotherapy, common factors research 
has revealed that no one therapeutic technique or modality is significantly more effective than 
another.  Researchers have concluded that it is the common factors that are responsible for 
producing client change (Norcross & Grencavage, 1989; Drisko, 2004, p. 84).  Relationship 
factors have been identified as a significant common factor component contributing to client 
change, second only to client extratherapeutic factors (Drisko, 2004; Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 
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2009; Tannen & Daniels, 2010).  Relationship factors comprise therapist effects, including 
empathy, affective attunement, and mutual affirmation to name a few, as well as the therapeutic 
alliance – the co-created interpersonal space between client and clinician (Hubble, Duncan, & 
Miller, 2009).  The subject matter of this theoretical study, the embodied intersubjective context 
of clinical practice, can be conceived of as existing beneath the umbrella of relationship factors 
within the common factors framework.  The therapist’s ability to tune into the embodied 
intersubjective field of communication is one small aspect of therapist effect.  Understanding the 
clinical encounter as an embodied intersubjective process is a way of further contextualizing the 
therapeutic alliance across a diverse range of psychotherapy modalities.  
Structural Overview of the Thesis 
 
As stated above, this theoretical study explores the intersection of two paradigmatic shifts 
in clinical theory and practice: a shift toward an intersubjective context and a shift toward 
bodily-based affect.  In accordance with the theoretical thesis format, I use relational 
psychoanalytic theory and interpersonal neurobiology as the two main theoretical lenses through 
which I will explore the phenomenon of embodied intersubjectivity.  
In the following chapter I provide a brief intersubjective phenomenological frame to give 
the reader a sense of the philosophical theories underpinning the ideas presented in this paper.  I 
then provide an introduction to the relevant fields from which embodied intersubjectivity is 
currently developing.  As I have not devoted an entire chapter to body psychotherapy, I offer 
somewhat more detailed background related to this field.   Chapter II concludes with definitions 
of relevant concepts and terms.   
In chapter III, I turn to relational psychoanalysis: a historical overview of the 
development of relational theory will be followed by an in-depth exploration of the 
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intersubjective context of clinical work.  In chapter IV, I explore how research and theory from 
the field of interpersonal neurobiology supports an embodied intersubjective understanding of 
the clinical context.  In both chapters III and IV, I refer to contemporary developmental 
psychology and infant research, as both relational psychoanalysis and interpersonal neurobiology 
incorporate research from these fields into their theories.  Throughout this paper, I weave 
literature and terminology from the field of body psychotherapy with that of relational 
psychoanalysis and interpersonal neurobiology to illuminate the phenomenon of embodied 
intersubjectivity.  In the discussion chapter, I integrate findings from the preceding chapters and 
argue that gaining a deeper experiential awareness of one’s embodied sense of self, through the 
process of being in relationship with another embodied being, is one of the transformative 
aspects of psychotherapy. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Framework and Conceptualization 
 
“Those who are aware of themselves as centered ‘inside’ an insulated container…are 
captured by an illusion generated by the mechanisms of ego-protection, as well as by 
spatial models inherited from a classical science which is now outmoded.”                          
 
- Deborah Hay (2000, p. 13) 
 
An Intersubjective Phenomenological Frame 
Descartes famously argued in the seventeenth century that a sense of self develops out of 
cognition: I think, therefore I am.  In one fell swoop, Descartes introduced a fundamental split: 
the isolated mind existed both divided from the body and separated from other human beings and 
the external world (Frie & Reis, 2001).  Freud, influenced by both the age of Enlightenment and 
the Scientific Revolution, accepted and built upon Cartesian rationality.  Classical 
psychoanalysis understood the mind/body problem through a dualistic frame, conceiving the 
body and mind as separate entities (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 41).   
 The theories presented in this paper are fundamentally phenomenological and 
intersubjective in nature.  Most simply defined, intersubjectivity has to do with, “the nature of 
interaction between two subjectivities” (Frie & Reis, 2001, p. 297).  The philosophical concept 
of intersubjectivity developed out of continental philosophers’ attempts to overcome the isolated 
and dualistic Cartesian understanding of consciousness: “philosophers since Descartes have 
sought to link human subjectivity, or self-consciousness, to our interactions with other human 
beings and the world around us” (Frie & Reis, 2001, p. 300).  Although numerous philosophers 
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have contributed unique and divergent points of view on intersubjectivity and phenomenology, 
for the purposes of this paper I will briefly highlight the relevant contributions of G. W. F. Hegel 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.   
According to Frie & Reis (2001), Hegel’s “intersubjective model of self-
consciousness…is frequently seen as the precursor of psychoanalytic theories of 
intersubjectivity” (p. 301).  In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1977), Hegel proposed that 
individual self-consciousness is reliant on recognition by another self-conscious being.  It is only 
through the process of being recognized by another that we become self-conscious, come to 
know ourselves (Benjamin, 1988; Frie & Reis, 2001; Stern, 2009).  In every relationship there 
are two self-conscious beings each striving to achieve recognition, and thus engaged in a struggle 
for recognition.   Hegel famously referred to this mutual struggle for recognition as the master-
slave dialectic.  Benjamin (2004), influenced by Hegel, defines intersubjectivity “in terms of a 
relationship of mutual recognition – a relation in which each person experiences the other as a 
‘like subject,’ another mind who can be ‘felt with,’ yet has a distinct, separate center of feeling 
and perception” (p. 5).  In the next chapter I will further discuss how Benjamin built upon 
Hegel’s model of self-consciousness in her intersubjective theory of development.   
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), in Phenomenology of Perception, argued that we experience the 
external world and acquire knowledge through bodily-based sense perception.  This concept, that 
“we can only understand our lived world with the apparatus with which we are provided to sense 
it, namely our bodies” is known as the lived-body paradigm (Shaw, 2003, p. 39).  For Merleau-
Ponty, perception is prereflective in that we are perceiving the world around us through our 
bodies from the moment we are born.  In other words, our first experience of ourselves in the 
world, and in relation with others, is an embodied experience.  
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From a phenomenological perspective, our bodies are formed in relationship with others: 
“the experience of our body results from the dyadic process of sensing the other, and the other 
sensing us” (Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 95).  Embodied being, which is the only type of being humans 
can know, is dialectical and interactive in its very nature.  Frie and Reis (2001) explain: “All of 
our experiences and the meanings that animate our lives follow from our bodily involvement 
with the world.  To exist as a body is to be inherently interactional” (p. 306).  From this 
perspective, we do not exist because we think, but rather because we are embodied (Totton, 
2003). The fields of body psychotherapy, relational psychoanalysis, and interpersonal 
neurobiology all reject the Cartesian dualistic split between body and mind and embrace the 
phenomenological perspective of an embodied, interrelational state of being: “Where once the 
mind was seen as isolated from others and divided from the body, these theorists see subjectivity 
as developing and existing within an intersubjective and bodily context” (Frie & Reis, 2001, p. 
307).  
The intersubjective relational paradigm, now at the forefront of psychoanalytic theory and 
practice, and characterized by an inclusive theoretical stance, has encouraged an open dialogue 
to develop between relational psychoanalysts, body psychotherapists, and neuroscientists (Ben-
Shahar, 2014).  The intersection of these fields has sparked a renewed interest in nonverbal 
affective communication and has brought the body back into mainstream discourse.  The client 
and therapist’s bodily phenomena are no longer understood as distinct from their minds (Shaw, 
2003, p. 33).  Physical sensations, once devalued in clinical practice, are now viewed as a 
valuable source of information (Hopenwasser, p. 216).  Instead of I think therefore I am, Ben-
Shahar (2014) suggests, “I am embodied in a relational context, therefore I am” (p. 91) and Fogel 
(2009), “I feel, therefore I am” (p. 27). 
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Body Psychotherapy 
Although the body was at the center of Freud’s metapsychology when he proclaimed that 
the ego was, “first and foremost a body ego” (Freud, 1923, p. 26), it was subsequently 
marginalized within the field of psychoanalysis, which became known as ‘the talking cure’ 
(Young, 2006).  Freud’s interest in developing psychoanalysis as a natural science led to a 
disavowal of the body in clinical practice (Rappaport, 2015; Ben-Shahar, 2014).  Thus, the body 
was largely ignored in the therapeutic encounter, with the exception of the work of Wilhelm 
Reich, considered the forefather of body psychotherapy.  Reich’s work, however, was highly 
controversial and he was eventually expelled from the psychoanalytic community.  Shaw (2004) 
contends that the body was thrown out of psychoanalytic discourse along with Reich (p. 271).  
While the field of body psychology has kept the place of the body alive and well in 
psychotherapeutic practice, it has historically remained on the periphery, viewed as a 
controversial outsider by other psychotherapy orientations.   
The relationship between mind and body has always been at the core of body 
psychotherapy (Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 91).  Research from the neurosciences is now confirming 
many of the theories that have long guided the practice of body psychotherapists.  In Body 
Psychotherapy: An Introduction, Nick Totton (2003), a British body psychotherapist and one of 
the founders of Embodied-Relational Therapy, defines body psychotherapy as follows:  
Body psychotherapy, then, is a therapy for the whole person which approaches whatever 
facet of a given individual – body symptoms, sensations, feelings, images, thoughts, 
subtle energy, spirituality – is most accessible in this moment as a way of making contact. 
It then tries to work inwards from that point to the more defended, ignored or excluded 
aspects of that person’s being. It is body psychotherapy only in that it does not exclude 
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the body, but treats embodiment as an intrinsic and important feature of human existence. 
(p. 26) 
In his book Touching The Relational Edge: Body Psychotherapy Ben-Shahar (2014), 
building upon Totton’s (2003) categorization of body psychotherapy modalities, divides the 
diverse array of body psychotherapy modalities into six categories: Reichian body 
psychotherapy, personal development and human potential treatments, body psychotherapy for 
trauma work, process oriented body psychotherapy, expressive body psychotherapy, and 
relational body psychotherapy (p. 39).  Within each of these categories are a variety of 
submodalities that offer unique and sometimes contradictory theoretical positions and practice 
techniques including touch, breath-work, movement, and more.  Nevertheless, all of these 
various sub-fields of body psychotherapy view the self as an embodied entity and share the 
common goal of increasing sensory awareness in the client.  At the same time, “Body 
psychotherapy recognizes that there is no living human body without mind – no soma without 
psyche; and therefore in approaching a human body we are also approaching a human mind” 
(Totton, 2003, p. 24).  By working with the body directly, body psychotherapists seek to assist 
clients in releasing bodily-based restrictions, uncovering nonverbal emotional memory, and 
thereby “dissolve[ing] a corresponding pattern of psychological restraint” (Totton, p. 19). 
Body psychotherapists generally work from a holistic approach meaning that the 
bodymind (client) is conceptualized as a whole that can never be fully understood by breaking it 
down into its component parts.  Traditionally, the western medical model, which psychoanalysis 
grew out of, has approached the body as a biological entity.  Although many neuroscientists and 
psychoanalysts are now in agreement with body psychotherapists in accepting the bodymind as 
existing on a biopsychosocial continuum, body psychotherapists view the bodymind as larger 
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than the sum of its parts whereas neuroscientists, and many psychoanalysts, generally relate to 
the bodymind in a more reductionist fashion (Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 96, 97).  Within the field of 
interpersonal neurobiology this is beginning to shift. 
A vast array of somatic techniques, particularly in the field of traumatology, have 
exploded over the last few decades and are increasingly incorporated into mainstream 
psychotherapy.  This theoretical study will not expound upon specific somatic techniques or 
skills aimed at engendering greater embodied awareness in the client and therapist.  Rather, this 
study will focus on understanding the context of clinical work as an embodied intersubjective 
matrix as well as how this understanding affects clinical practice.  In other words, this thesis 
seeks to contribute to the theoretical underpinnings that are common to all psychosomatic 
therapy modalities.    
Relational Psychoanalysis 
 
The relational paradigm shift in psychoanalysis, which took shape during the 1980s, 
influenced by the postmodern era, reconceptualized the psychotherapeutic encounter as a 
relationship between two subjective bodyminds.  The relational model was originally 
conceptualized as a theoretical umbrella, “capable of holding the dialectical tension between the 
interpersonal and intrapsychic” (Aron & Lechich, 2012, p. 213).  The terms relational and 
intersubjective are often used interchangeably, which speaks to how central the concept of 
intersubjectivity is to contemporary relational psychoanalysis. The late 20th century saw the 
influence of postmodernism across a wide range of disciplines, including psychoanalysis.  The 
postmodernist critique of absolute, objective truths and the theoretical constructs of positivism 
led intersubjective psychoanalytic theorists to rethink the therapist’s position as an objective, 
neutral observer.  As opposed to Freud’s initial conception of a scientific observer (therapist) 
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making objective interpretations about a subject’s (client’s) isolated intrapsychic mind, in the 
intersubjective perspective, the therapist and client are viewed as two subjectivities interacting in 
a field of mutual regulation and recognition.   
The intersubjective position focuses on how the therapist and client’s individual intrapsychic 
experiences intermingle, interact, and jointly influence one another in the context of the 
treatment relationship.  Relational theory is not only interested in the client’s internal experience 
but also the clinician’s and actively seeks to understand how the two relate to one another in the 
treatment relationship.  Contemporary intersubjective relational psychoanalysts, influenced by 
developmental/attachment theory, infant research, and feminist theory, have reimagined the 
clinical encounter.  Throughout this paper I use the terms relational psychoanalysis, interpersonal 
relational psychoanalysis, and intersubjective relational psychoanalysis interchangeably to refer 
to the broad field of relational/interpersonal/intersubjective psychoanalysis.  The field of 
relational psychoanalysis will be explored in-depth in chapter III. 
Relational Body Psychotherapy 
The burgeoning field of relational body psychotherapy is beginning to bring together the 
theories of relational psychoanalysis, the findings of interpersonal and developmental 
neuroscience, and the theory and technique of body psychotherapy (Ben-Shahar, 2014; Nolan, 
2014).  Ben-Shahar (2014) describes this merging of theories as a “relational-embodied 
paradigm” (p. 16). According to Nolan the “relational body-mind perspective” is drawn from 
humanistic psychotherapy, relational body psychotherapy, relational psychoanalysis, infant 
development research and neuroscience.  Nick Totton (2003, 2012) and Asaf Ben-Shahar (2010, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2014) are two of the central contributors to this developing field.  
According to Ben-Shahar (2014), relational body psychotherapy “represents a determined effort 
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to maintain the bodily focus of body psychotherapy, including somatic intervention, without 
reducing the complex tapestry of the therapeutic relationship: an attempt to hold the paradoxical 
polarities rather than choose one over the other” (p. 58).    
Ben Shahar (2014) acknowledges that the field of relational body psychotherapy has been 
deeply influenced by the ideas of contemporary relational psychoanalysis, particularly the 
concept of an intersubjective analytic third space.  Although Ben-Shahar notes that relational 
psychoanalytic theorists are beginning to attend to embodied communication, he argues that 
relational psychoanalysts would learn a great deal from further familiarizing themselves with the 
theory and technique of body psychotherapists (p. 94, 104).  I agree with Ben-Shahar on this 
point and believe the concept of embodied intersubjectivity reaches far outside the confines of 
relational body psychotherapy and is relevant to a wide range of clinical practice.  Theoretical 
principles from the field of relational body psychotherapy can be incorporated into more 
traditional models of talk therapy.  One does not need to work directly with the body to 
incorporate a relational embodied perspective into one’s work.  
Interpersonal Neurobiology 
Over the last two decades and due in large part to the developing technology of brain 
imaging, research in the neurosciences has begun to translate “classical psychoanalytic concepts 
into brain structures and circuitry” (Marks-Tarlow, 2014, p. 224).    Interpersonal neurobiologists 
are conducting research and are theorizing on the problem of the mind/body, which has long 
concerned psychoanalysts and body psychotherapists alike: “what began as initial forays of the 
decade of the brain transformed into a torrent of 21st-century science’s more complex (re) 
explorations of the fundamental problems of brain/mind/body that are relevant to both 
researchers and clinicians” (A. N. Schore, 2012, p. 3).  Ultimately, the findings of interpersonal 
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neurobiologists, developmental neuroscientists, and neuropsychoanalysts are confirming the 
centrality of the treatment relationship and the relevance of the body in clinical practice.  Thus, 
in chapter IV, I will use interpersonal neurobiology, primarily focusing on the contributions of 
Daniel Siegel and Allan Schore, as a lens through which to understand the phenomenon of 
embodied intersubjectivity.  
Although research from the field of traumatology will not be covered in this paper due to 
limited space and time, it is worth noting that traumatology research has also been instrumental in 
leading a new movement toward somatically-informed psychotherapy.  It is now widely accepted 
that post-traumatic stress is both a mental and physical reaction to trauma.  Traumatic memories are 
understood to be stored in the nervous system and thus, in the body.   Various somatically-oriented 
treatment techniques and body-based interventions such as Peter Levine’s somatic experiencing and 
Pat Ogden’s sensorimotor psychotherapy are increasingly becoming more widely accepted as 
treatment methods for trauma.   
 I would like to propose that it is not only traumatized clients who need to reconnect with 
their embodied experience of self in order to heal from what we consider to be mental affliction.  
Wylie (2004) states:  
It’s been an implicit premise of psychological science and clinical practice both, as it is of 
our entire culture that our singular human identity resides in our disembodied minds. The 
West’s infatuation with Cartesian dualism has made our bodies somehow strange to us, a 
self-alienation reinforced by clinical psychology (p. 5). 
Thanks to interdisciplinary research across a variety of fields within the social sciences, 
particularly the neurosciences, we now know that emotions are inherently embodied experiences.  
The embodied felt sense can no longer be disregarded in the psychotherapeutic encounter.   
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Definition of Relevant Terms and Concepts 
 
The problematic nature of attempting to describe bodily sensations, nonsymbolic 
experience, through words is clearly evident throughout this paper.  Ultimately, somatic 
experience is intangible subjective phenomena that cannot be translated into verbal experience 
(Shaw, 2004, p. 284).  Bromberg (1991) explains, “No matter how evocative the language, words 
are but symbols for the experiential ‘thing’ as a felt truth” (p. 401). 
In discussing Lacan’s position on the tension between experience and symbolization, 
Knoblauch (2005) tells us that there is always going to be “a gap between experience and its 
representation that is impossible to communicate and fully know” (p. 814) due to “the limitations 
of symbolization because of the displacement effect of language and the futility that language 
meets as description of lived experience” (p. 808).  And yet, to develop a theoretical 
understanding of the relevance of embodied experience in clinical practice we must attempt to 
describe it with words, knowing that we have set ourselves an unattainable and somewhat absurd 
task.  It is thus easy to understand why a common language with which to describe embodied 
intersubjectivity has yet to develop.  In the following section and throughout this paper I will 
demonstrate how the fields of body psychotherapy, relational psychoanalysis, and interpersonal 
neurobiology are using different terminology to express similar ideas related to the phenomenon 
of embodied intersubjectivity. 
Embodiment. 
 
The intersubjective exchange and co-creation of an embodied sense of self is the focus of 
this paper.  Embodiment does not refer to the physical body itself but rather to the subjective 
experience, the felt sense, of being a body.  Totton (2003) defines embodiment as “the state of 
being united bodymind” and further explains that the term embodiment is “often used to name 
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the state of experiencing this unity” (p. 62).  When we have a felt sense of our bodymind, we are 
experiencing an embodied state of being.  Similar to Totton’s definition, Ben-Shahar (2014) 
makes a distinction between two ways in which he uses the term embodiment: “The 
first…signifies a phenomenon whereby our entire existence is a priori embodied…The second 
way of using the term is as a skill of strengthening and cultivating the relationship between the 
bodily and the psychological aspects of our being” (p. 93).  For the purposes of this paper I will 
use the term embodiment to describe both a subjective state of being and a skill that can be 
honed (Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 94).  
Bodymind, mindbody, and brain-mind-body.  
 
Throughout the literature drawn upon in this paper, the bodymind continuum is referred 
to variously as bodymind, mindbody, and brain-mind-body.  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
use these terms interchangeably.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that each field generally 
tends to highlight the part of the whole that it primarily focuses on.  The body psychotherapists 
tend to refer to the bodymind (Totton, 2003; Ben-Shahar, 2014), the relational psychoanalysts 
tend to refer to the mindbody (Anderson, 2008; Aron & Anderson, 1998), and the interpersonal 
neurobiologists to the brain-mind-body (Marks-Tarlow, 2014; A. N. Schore, 2012). 
The felt sense. 
 
The term, felt-sense, was coined by Eugene Gendlin, an American philosopher and 
psychotherapist.   In his research, Gendlin found that clients who naturally connected verbal 
insights with bodily-based feelings reported the greatest benefits from psychotherapy.   
His conclusion was that such clients were naturally able to use bodily sensing to (a) feel 
for words with which to express otherwise murky or unclear aspects of their experience, 
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and (b) check out whether their own or other people’s verbal articulation of a problem 
was in resonance with their direct somatic experience of it. (Wilberg, 2003, p. 5) 
Based on his research findings Gendlin developed a technique called Focusing designed to help 
both clients and therapists develop inward bodily attention.  In his now classic text, Focusing 
(1996), Gendlin attempts to define the felt sense in the following ways:   
 
The felt sense is the holistic, implicit bodily sense of a complex situation (p. 58).  
 
A felt sense is a bodily sensation, but it is not merely a physical sensation like a tickle or a 
pain.  Rather, it is a physical sense of something, of meaning, of implicit intricacy.  It is a 
sense of a whole situation or problem or concern, or perhaps a point one wants to convey.  It 
is not just a bodily sense, but rather a bodily sense of… (p. 63). 
 
A characteristic of this felt sense is that it is experienced as an intricate whole.  Once can 
sense that it includes many intricacies and strands.  It is not uniform like a piece of iron or 
butter.  Rather it is a whole complexity, a multiplicity implicit in a single sense (p. 20). 
  
It is clear from the above quotes that the felt sense is a way of describing an intangible 
subjective phenomena that cannot fully be put into words.  The felt sense does not refer to well-
known emotions such as fear, anger, sadness, or surprise, to name a few.  The felt sense refers to 
a sensation in the body of something that cannot be defined or quantified and is more complex 
than a single emotion (Gendlin, 1996, p. 19).  The technique of Focusing helps the client to get in 
touch with his/her implicit felt sense as well as to develop what is at first vague and ambiguous 
into something that can be consciously known (Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 53).  The clinician’s ability 
to attune with her own bodily-based felt sense of her moment-to-moment experience opens the 
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possibility for an embodied communication between client and clinician as well as the 
opportunity for the client to deepen his/her own felt bodily sense of self.   
Peter Wilberg (2003), a radical British philosopher and psychologist, built upon 
Gendlin’s work with an approach he refers to as soma-psychology.  What Gendlin refers to as 
the felt sense, Wilberg calls soma-sensitivity.  According to Wilberg, whereas Focusing is 
primarily concerned with the factors that contribute to developing a client’s felt sense of self, 
soma-sensitivity training is geared toward assisting therapists to increase their effectiveness by 
developing “bodily self-awareness and sensitivity to the body of the client” (p. 5).  Although I 
will not use Wilberg’s terminology in this paper, I would like to highlight the distinction he 
makes between the physical body and the “inwardly felt body” of both client and therapist (p. 4).  
Wilberg (2004) explains that psychotherapy is “effective only to the degree to which [it] not only 
alter [s] the client’s mental state or mood but deepens their felt bodily sense of self and of inner 
connectedness to other” (p. 4).   
Embodied self-awareness. 
 
Alan Fogel, (2009) an American psychologist and researcher on social and emotional 
development, makes a distinction between conceptual self-awareness, “thinking about the self,” 
and embodied self-awareness, “feeling the self” (p. 10).  Fogel defines conceptual self-awareness 
as “engagement in a thought process of categorizing, planning, reasoning, judging, and 
evaluating” (p. 1) and places this type of self-awareness in the left-hemisphere of the brain.  
Embodied self-awareness is defined as, “the ability to pay attention to ourselves, to feel our 
sensations, emotions, and movements online, in the present moment, without the mediating 
influence of judgmental thoughts” (p. 11) and is placed in the right-hemisphere of the brain.  
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Fogel argues that we define ourselves conceptually but we inhabit ourselves “via the concrete 
feeling and acting of embodied self-awareness” (p. 30). 
Embodied self-awareness involves both interoception and body schema.  Interoception is 
the ability to tune into sensations inside of our bodies including pain, visceral sensations, hunger, 
digestion, arousal, and the rise and fall of our breathe, to name a few.  Body schema refers to an 
awareness “of the movement and coordination between different parts of the body and between 
our body and the environment” (Fogel, 2009, p. 10, 11).   It is the ability of one part of the body 
to recognize another part of the body as part of the same whole.  Embodied self-awareness is 
what enables us to be emotionally present, experiencing our emotions as feeling states in the 
body.  According to Fogel, when we are in tune with our embodied self-awareness we are able to 
actually feel our sadness or excitement as sensations in the body (p. 11).  Embodied self-
awareness enables us to exist in what Fogel refers to as the subjective emotional present.   
Somatic resonance, affective resonance, and attunement. 
 
Somatic resonance or affective resonance is a useful term to describe what is actually 
taking place when a shared embodied awareness is co-created between two bodies in the 
intersubjective space.  Somatic resonance can be conceived of as a nonverbal, nonconscious 
conversation, or sharing of energy, taking place between two bodies and has to do with the 
“capacity to sense another person through our bodies” (Ben-Shahar, 2012, p. 13, 14).  When the 
therapist is able to resonate with the client’s felt sense, both client and therapist will recognize 
this resonance as “a shift in the felt quality of the dyadic field” (Wilberg, 2003, p. 11).   
Siegel (2012) suggests that the circuitry of our nervous systems allow us to create 
resonance by attuning with another.  Siegel defines attunement as an open and receptive focus on 
the flow of energy between two or more people or within one person, and resonance as the 
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process by which “our observing self takes on some of the features of that which we are 
observing” (p. 23).  According to Siegel, when two people are attuned to one another, an 
interpersonal resonance is co-created “in which each person feels felt by the other” (p. 23).  This 
concept will be further discussed in the section on mirror neurons in Chapter IV.   
True and false self. 
D. W. Winnicott’s oft-referred to concept of true self (Ghent, 1990; Bromberg, 1991; 
Fogel, 2009; Benjamin, 2005; Ben-Shahar, 2014; and others) is rooted in embodied self-
awareness.  The development of true and false self originates in Winnicott’s theory regarding the 
capacity to be alone in the presence of another.  By the phrase “capacity to be alone,” Winnicott 
does not mean actually being alone but rather the ability to enjoy solitude, which comes from the 
early life experience of feeling alone in the presence of a primary caregiver.  In Winnicott’s 
(1965) words: “Thus the basis of the capacity to be alone is a paradox; it is the experience of 
being alone while someone else is present” (p. 30).  It is this early life experience of being alone 
in the presence of the primary caregiver that encourages the development of the true self.   
Winnicott (1965) uses the term ego-relatedness to describe a relationship between two 
people, child and caregiver (therapist and client), that allows for both togetherness and aloneness 
at the same time.  In ego-relatedness one or both people are focused on the experience of being 
alone, “yet the presence of each is important to the other” (p. 31).   Through being alone in the 
presence of an attentive but non-demanding caregiver the infant begins to detect its own 
“personal life.”  Winnicott (1965) explains:  
When alone in the sense that I am using the term, and only when alone, the infant is able 
to do the equivalent of what in an adult would be called relaxing.  The infant is able to 
become unintegrated, to flounder, to be in a state in which there is no orientation, to be 
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able to exist for a time without being either a reactor to an external impingement or an 
active person with a direction of interest or movement….In the course of time there 
arrives a sensation or an impulse.  In this setting the sensation or impulse will feel real 
and be truly a personal experience. (p. 34) 
Winnicott is articulating an experience of self that originates from a place of interoception, a 
sensing from within. This personal impulse, expressed by the infant through a spontaneous 
gesture is, in essence, the potential of true self.  That potential, which Winnicott seems to believe 
human beings are born with, is developed into a true or false self through being in relationship 
with the primary caregiver.  The self develops “out of the subtle dialectic of maternal 
responsiveness” (Mitchell, 1992, p. 5).  According to Winnicott, the development of a true or 
false self hinges on the way in which the primary caregiver responds to the infant’s spontaneous 
gesture.  Winnicott (1965) explains the conditions for a “moment of illusion” that leads to the 
development of true self: 
The good-enough mother meets the omnipotence of the infant and to some extent makes 
sense of it.  She does this repeatedly.  A True Self begins to have a life, through the 
strength given to the infant’s weak ego by the mother’s implementation of the infant’s 
omnipotent expressions. (p. 145)   
The misattuned caregiver, instead of sensing the infant’s authentic impulse, imposes his/her own 
impulse upon the infant.  The infant, in an attempt to make sense of the caregiver’s imposed 
impulse, experienced as an “external impingement” complies with it: “the baby learns to want 
what the mother gives, to become the mother’s idea of who the baby is” (Mitchell, 1992, p. 10).  
This compliance is the earliest development of the false self.  In other words, the false self is a 
self that is constructed in reaction to external stimuli.  Infants and children would rather 
 26 
compromise their authentic sense of self than risk being unaccepted, or worse unloved, by the 
primary caregiver.   
True and false self-states exist on a continuum and everyone has some degree of both.  In 
a healthy individual, the false self is essentially a social self that protects the true self from the 
external world (Grolnick, 1990).  The need for security, the desire to exist in a social context 
with others, leads to self-consciousness regarding how one’s spontaneous self-expression 
impacts others.  It is this desire to maintain secure relationships that leads to some level of 
development of a false self in all people (Mitchell, 1992).  When the false self develops to the 
point of pathology, the individual is left feeling “unreal or a sense of futility” (Winnicott, 1965, 
p. 148).  Authentic spontaneity and a felt sense of realness are the main features of true self 
whereas feeling unreal and inauthentic are the main features of false self.  False self can present 
in a number of different ways.  On a bodily-based level, clients who appear to be wearing 
muscular armor (Ben-Shahar, 2014) or clients whose movements are restricted may be struggling 
with an overdeveloped false self.   
For the purposes of this paper, the important take away is that the potential to experience 
true self comes from an awareness of one’s physiological processes at any given moment in time.  
Winnicott (1965) tells us, “The True Self comes from the aliveness of the body tissues and the 
working of body-functions, including the heart’s action and breathing” (p. 148).  Thus, true self 
is deeply related to embodied self-awareness.  
Mitchell (1992) argues that since Freud’s structural and topographical models, 
psychoanalytic theoreticians have accepted a spatial metaphor for conceptualizing the self and 
thus attempted to locate the center of the self.  Mitchell proposes that it is perhaps more useful to 
conceptualize the self  “as a temporal rather than a spatial phenomenon” (p. 9). From this point 
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of view, there is no static, innate, core self existing in space.  Instead there are true or authentic 
experiences existing over time.  According to Mitchell, “the crucial difference lies not in the 
specific content of what I feel or do, but in the relationship between what I feel and do and the 
spontaneous configuration and flow of my experience at that point in time” (p. 9).  The same 
content, action, behavior, or thought can feel like an authentic expression of one’s experience of 
self in a particular time and place, and like an inauthentic expression of one’s experience of self 
in another time and place.  Thus, there is no true self, however, there is true or authentic self 
experience.  I return to the concept of true and false self as it relates to embodied 
intersubjectivity and embodied recognition in the discussion chapter of this paper.  
Limitations and Potential Bias 
 
Engaging with a topic as ineffable as embodied intersubjectivity presents clear 
limitations.  As previously acknowledged, words cannot do justice to a topic that exists in the 
domain of embodied, interpersonal experience.  Additionally, the topic of embodied 
intersubjectivity is vast.  I have drawn upon a wide range of theoretical research from interrelated 
fields and yet I have just begun to skim the surface of the literature that is relevant to a deeper 
understanding of the topic at hand.   The enormity of this topic combined with the limited scope 
of a master’s thesis means that this study is incomplete and the basis for further inquiry at best 
(Zucker, 2014). 
Intersubjective theory recognizes that we cannot escape our own subjectivity.  I can only 
engage with the ideas and theories presented in this paper through my personal subjective lens.  
Although I strive to stay alert to the ways in which my personal subjective bias may exert 
influence over this paper, I know that there is much that remains unconscious. While my 
education and clinical experience are relevant, it is my personal experience with psychotherapy 
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and embodiment practices that has most informed both my choice of topic as well as my 
approach.  Before coming to the field of clinical social work, I studied modern dance and yoga.  I 
have experienced numerous forms of bodywork including therapeutic massage, Rolfing, and 
Zero Balancing to name a few.  I have also worked with a number of psychodynamically 
informed psychotherapists over the last 12 years.  As noted in the introduction to this paper, I 
have experienced psychological benefits from combining what I have learned in the 
aforementioned modalities.  It is important to note that my privileged social position as a white, 
upper-middle-class, heterosexual cisgender woman has afforded me the opportunity to engage 
with such a wide array of embodiment practices and long-term psychotherapy.  Further, my 
sociocultural identity has influenced how I have been treated as a consumer of these services and 
consequently how they have affected me.  All of this has informed my beliefs about the 
relevance of embodied self-awareness to mental health and thus influenced the construction and 
execution of this theoretical study.   
In the following chapter I turn to relational psychoanalysis.  I begin with a historical 
overview, placing the relational paradigm shift in context.  I then consider some of the core 
concepts of relational theory including the relational perspective on intersubjectivity, 
transference/countertransference, and thirdness.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
RELATIONAL THEORY  
 
“The basic relational configurations have, by definition, three dimensions – the self, the other, 
and the space between the two.  There is no “object” in a psychologically meaningful sense 
without some particular sense of oneself in relation to it.  There is no “self,” in a psychologically 
meaningful sense, in isolation, outside a matrix of relations with others.  Neither the self nor the 
object are meaningful dynamic concepts without presupposing some sense of psychic space in 
which they interact, in which they do things with or to each other.”                                                 
 
- Steven Mitchell (1988, p. 33) 
 
Relational theory is not defined by a singular school of thought or cohesive set of theoretical 
principles.  The relational model has been portrayed as a “big tent” (Aron & Lechich, 2012, p. 
211), a “conceptual space” (Mitchell, 1988, p. xvii), and a “shared subculture” (Mitchell & Aron, 
1999, p. xii).  As opposed to a unified theoretical model, it is better conceptualized as a 
framework defined by shared principles: a space in which diverse sets of relational perspectives 
coexist in dialectical tension with one another.  Mitchell & Aron (1999) describe the relational 
matrix as placing “an emphasis on maintaining the tension between the extremes, on ambiguity, 
dialogue, dialectic, and paradox” (p. xviii), while Aron and Lechich (2012) define the relational 
model as characterized by, “pluralism and multiplicity, emphasizing ‘both/and’ rather than 
‘either/or’” (p. 211). Such openness and multiplicity makes it nearly impossible to encompass all 
of relational theory in a single chapter.   Thus, I will begin with a brief historical overview of the 
roots of relational theory, providing some background for the evolution of key relational 
concepts.  The theory of a relational mind, the concept of intersubjectivity, the 
reconceptualization of the transference/countertransference dynamic, and the concept of the 
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analytic third will be explored.  Particular attention will be paid to Jessica Benjamin’s 
construction of intersubjectivity, mutual recognition, and thirdness. 
Steven A. Mitchell (1988), considered one of the most prolific and central contributors to 
relational theory, observed that, post Freud’s death, the field of psychoanalysis suffered from a 
lack of communication between various theoretical schools of thought, creating a fractured 
discipline. Mitchell argues that such a divide existed because the field of psychoanalysis 
remained stuck under the shadow of Freud’s structural and drive metatheory: a comprehensive 
explanation of human nature.  The creation of a closed, complete theory became the norm in the 
field of psychoanalysis, creating multiple schools of thought cut off from one another (Mitchell, 
1988, p. 6).    
Instead of striving to create one individual metatheory, Mitchell and other early relational 
theorists, Greenberg, Ghent, Bromberg, among others, endeavored to create an atmosphere in 
which multiple relational theories might coexist in dialectical tension with one another.  Mitchell 
and Aron (1999) suggest that one of the central beliefs of relational theory, “is the 
‘deconstruction’ of misleading dichotomies and exaggerated polarization” (p. xviii) previously 
prevalent in the psychoanalytic community.  
Historical Background 
In their seminal text in which they introduce the concept of a relational matrix, Greenberg 
and Mitchell (1983) delineate two incompatible and fundamentally alternative models of mind: a 
classical drive theory model and a relational model.  Mitchell (1988) remarks:  
The distinction between a monadic theory of mind and an interactive, relational theory of 
mind…is crucial in sorting out differences among psychoanalytic concepts.…Although 
all psychoanalytic theories contain both monadic and dyadic features, each theory 
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necessarily breaks on one side or the other of this dichotomy in assigning the source of 
the structuralization of experience, the shaping of meaning, and this choice is 
fundamental. (p. 5) 
Freud originally conceptualized psychoanalysis as a natural science complete with 
objective truths regarding human nature.  For Freud, the mind was prewired; the infant came into 
this world with internal, pre-structured drives.  Freud’s theory of mind viewed human beings as 
biological organisms driven by a need to discharge physical tension that developed due to bestial 
urges.  Freud believed these bestial urges took shape in the mind as sexual and aggressive wishes 
pushing to be released.   As the child is socialized, the mind begins to develop “complex and 
elegant compromises between the expression of impulses and the defenses which control and 
channel them” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 2).  The ego is constantly negotiating between the expression 
of desire and the fear of punishment.  In Freud’s conceptual framework, psychopathology was 
the result of repressed sexual and aggressive fantasies; drive energy that had not been sufficiently 
discharged.  Relationships with others were viewed simply as “vehicles for the expression of 
drive and defenses” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 39).  
All of psychodynamic theory and practice is based on Freud’s groundbreaking discovery 
of the unconscious mind, a contribution that has forever altered how we understand ourselves.  In 
the words of Ben-Shahar (2014):   
According to Freud, humans were primarily acting unconsciously, unaware of the drives, 
anxieties, and desires that motivated them…self-awareness was not a given but had to be 
worked at and gained: we were required to pursue self-knowledge, with diligence and 
integrity, in order to fully assume the human potential inherent in us all. (p. 12)   
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By discovering the unconscious and providing us with a technique to delve into its depths, Freud 
gave us the ability to know ourselves more deeply. However, Freud’s structural model stayed 
within the boundaries of the Cartesian isolated mind: “a self-enclosed wordless subject or mental 
apparatus containing and working over mental contents and ontologically separated from its 
surround” (Stolorow, 2013, p. 384).    
British object relations theory. 
The British object relations movement, forged in the 1940s and 1950s in Great Britain, 
signified a departure away from Freud’s emphasis on biological drives and a mind in isolation 
and towards an emphasis on actual relationships with others.  The object relations movement 
consisted of numerous schools of thought: “a cluster of largely unrelated theoretical innovations” 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xi).  What the various object relations theorists held in common was 
a recognition of, and emphasis on, how being in relationship with others helped to form the 
intrapsychic environment of the individual.   
The term object in psychoanalysis is “defined as the largely human target or influencer of 
an instinctual impulse, or drive” (Ghent, 1992, p. xiii).   Melanie Klein was the first to use the 
term object relating.  Klein focused on how infant and caretaker’s interactions influenced the 
way the child related to the world around it.   Klein postulated that the infant was wired for 
human interaction but only in so much as the object (mother) satisfied the infant’s drives.  
Whereas for Freud the object was accidental, the nursing breast just happened to be attached to 
the mother, for Klein the object of desire was implicit in the experience of desire.  Klein 
imagined that the libidinal urge to love is accompanied by an image of a loving object.  Klein’s 
concept of object relating maintained allegiance with Freud in that objects were conceived of 
simply as a means to an ends; an object is valuable to a subject only in so far as it can satisfy a 
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libidinal or aggressive drive.  In this model, objects are drive derivatives (Mitchell & Aron, 
1999).  Although Klein is responsible for initiating a shift within classical theory toward object 
relations, Mitchell and Aron (1999) cite W.R.D. Fairbairn and Harry Stack Sullivan’s 
contributions as the “central theoretical axis” (p. xvii) of the relational turn. 
Through his work with abused and neglected children, Fairbairn became interested in 
understanding why human beings are prone to repeatedly engage in hurtful relationships if our 
primary drive, as Freud postulated, is pleasure seeking.  In answer to this question, Fairbairn 
formulated his theory of object relations and in the process made a radical departure away from 
Freud’s theory of instinctual drives.  For Fairbairn, being in relationship with others was the 
central organizing motivation of human behavior.  If a child is provided with pleasurable 
experiences early in life, that child will seek pleasure because pleasure is connected to the 
caregiver.  If, on the other hand, a child primarily experiences pain while interacting with the 
primary caregiver, that child will seek out pain as a means to being in relationship with others. 
Fairbairn viewed the intrapsychic world as developing out of relationships with early caregivers 
as opposed to Freud’s conception of an intrapsychic world ruled by biological urges (Ghent, 
1992, p. xiv).  Fairbairn stressed, “the longing, the hunger for contact and connection, that 
propels human relationships” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 28).  He viewed human beings as wired for 
human interaction and famously re-conceptualized the libido as object seeking as opposed to 
pleasure seeking.  Ghent (1992) describes Fairbairn’s reconceptualization of libido as “Clinging 
to terms that belong to drive theory while totally transforming their meaning” (p. xiv).  
American interpersonal theory. 
 
Around the same time that various theories of object relations were taking shape in Great 
Britain, the interpersonal school of psychoanalysis was forming in the United States.  Harry 
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Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, Clara Thompson and other interpersonal theorists founded the 
William Alanson White Institute, the home of interpersonal psychoanalysis, in the 1940s.  
Greenberg and Mitchell both trained at the William Alanson White Institute and thus were 
greatly influenced by interpersonal theory and practice (Aron & Lechich, 2012).    
  Whereas the British object relationalists emphasized the influence of early relationships 
on an individual’s intrapsychic environment, the interpersonalists emphasized the importance of 
real relationships in the external world.  For Sullivan, the “mind always emerges and develops 
contextually, in interpersonal fields” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. xv).  Sullivan felt the mind 
could not be conceived of as separate from the interactive field it was relating in.  In terms of 
clinical practice, the interpersonalists shifted the focus to present, here-and-now relations in the 
client’s life.  Sullivan and his colleagues were interested in understanding the origins of their 
clients’ interactive patterns of relating with others as opposed to past fantasies and impulses 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 64).  At the time it was established, the interpersonal school was 
considered a radical break from classical psychoanalytic schools of thought.  In retrospect, many 
relational and contemporary interpersonal theorists believe that, in an effort to separate from 
classical theory, the interpersonalists swung too far in the direction of external, interpersonal 
relationships and in the process “tended to deemphasize the internal world and internal psychic 
structures” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. ix).  
Although the British object relationalists and the American interpersonalists focused on 
different aspects of being in relationship with others and used different terminology they both 
ultimately broke with Freud’s structural/drive theory.  Both the British object relations school 
and the American interpersonal school emphasized the formative importance of being in 
relationship with others.  However, whereas the British object relations school emphasized the 
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presence of the “other” on the individual’s intrapsychic world, the American interpersonal school 
emphasized the influence of actual interpersonal relationships (Mitchell, 1988, p. 9).  
 Ferenczi. 
It would be remiss to discuss the historical roots of relational theory without making 
mention of Sandor Ferenczi who is often cited (Aron & Lechich, 2012; Ben-Shahar, 2010; 
Berzoff, 2011) as the forefather of a relational point of view although his contributions to the 
field were ignored for many years.  Ferenczi and Freud’s infamous split stemmed from 
Ferenczi’s interest in the interaction between analyst and analysand.  For Ferenczi, the 
relationship between the analyst and analysand was just as valuable an analytic tool as was 
understanding the intrapsychic world of the analysand, a belief held by many contemporary 
relational practitioners.  A detailed exploration of Ferenczi’s work is outside the scope of this 
paper, however, it is important to note that Ferenczi’s writing, particularly his concept of mutual 
analysis, has influenced many relational thinkers.   
Origins of the Relational Movement in Psychoanalysis: A Social Theory of Mind 
 
Relational theory began to take shape in the 1980’s with an emphasis on the relationship 
between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal.  The relational matrix sought to bridge a gap 
between the British object relations school and the American interpersonal school while also 
acknowledging the contributions and influence of various psychologies of the self, particularly 
Kohut’s self psychology and existential theories (Mitchell, 1988; Mitchell & Aron, 1999).  In 
addition to the above-mentioned primary influences, Mitchell and Aron (1999) also acknowledge 
intersubjectivity theory, American psychoanalytic feminist theory, social constructivism, modern 
ego psychology, contemporary psychoanalytic hermeneutics, the legacy of Sandor Ferenczi, and 
more, as playing a part in the relational turn of psychoanalysis (p. xi-xii).   
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The term, relational model, first appeared in Mitchell and Greenberg’s (1983), Object 
Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) trace the evolution of a 
paradigm shift, beginning with the British object relations school of thought, in psychoanalytic 
theory: a shift away from an individual theory of mind and towards a social theory of mind.  
Mitchell (1988) defines the relational model as, “an alternative perspective which considers 
relations with others, not drives, as the basic stuff of mental life” (p. 2) thus signifying a post-
Freudian era of psychoanalytic theory.   Human beings were no longer understood as driven by a 
biological need to discharge sexual and aggressive urges but rather as driven by a biological need 
for attachment; an intrinsic desire to be in relation with others. “Human beings did not evolve 
and then enter into social and cultural interactions; the human mind is, in its very origins and 
nature, a social product” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 18).  What all relational theories hold in common is 
an emphasis on how being in relationship, both real and imagined, molds psychic life.  
The genius of Mitchell and other early relational theorists was in recognizing how each of 
these separate theoretical schools of thought, British object relations theory, the American 
interpersonal school, and assorted self psychologies, complemented one another by focusing on a 
particular component of what came to be regarded as the relational matrix.  The relational matrix 
was conceived of as a framework for assimilating relational concepts from varied and distinct 
psychoanalytic schools of thought without assigning priority to any one theoretical system (Aron 
& Lechich, 2012, p. 213).  Each separate dimension of the relational matrix had already been 
expounded upon by different schools of thought: whereas the British object relations school 
focused on the intrapsychic world, the interpersonal school made interpersonal relations 
superordinate, and the self-psychologists focused primarily on self-organization.   Mitchell 
(1998) argues: “To assign priority to sense of self, object ties, or patterns of interaction is like 
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trying to decide whether it is the skin, the bones, or the musculature that preserves the body 
form” (p. 35).  Instead of placing priority on any one mode of being a multidimensional 
relational approach “takes into account self-organization, attachments to others (‘objects’), 
interpersonal transactions, and the active role of the analysand in the continual re-creation of his 
subjective world” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 8).   
Core Concepts of Relational Theory 
 There are two broad central tenets that define relational theory.  The first tenet, explored 
above, clearly articulates a distinction between a monadic, isolated mind, as in Freud’s drive 
theory, and an interpersonal mind that develops within a relational matrix.  The second tenet is 
an openness to maintain the dialectical tensions and multiplicities that inevitably exist in a theory 
and practice that attempts to explain human behavior.  Aron and Lechich (2012) point out that, 
historically, psychoanalytic theory has struggled with “binary oppositions such as 
conscious/unconscious, intrapsychic/interpersonal, inner world/outer behavior, conflict/deficit, 
oedipal/pre-oedipal” (p. 211) and I would add, mind/body.  With the construction of a third space 
in which a both/and perspective prevails, the relational model attempts to move beyond such 
dichotomies (Aron & Lechich, 2012, p. 211).   
Intersubjectivity and mutual recognition. 
Stolorow and his colleagues, working within the self psychology tradition, are credited with 
exposing the myth of the isolated Cartesian mind and introducing the concept of intersubjectivity 
into the American psychoanalytic dialogue (Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 1990; Aron & Lechich, 
2012).  Stolorow and Atwood (1992) define intersubjectivity as, “any psychological field formed 
by interacting worlds of experience” (p. 3).  In this view, intersubjectivity refers to the contextual 
field in which two subjectivities interact, while mutually and reciprocally influencing one 
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another.  Whereas Stolorow’s form of intersubjectivity is broadly conceptualized as a systems 
view, Jessica Benjamin has advanced a developmental view of intersubjectivity (Mills, 2005, p. 
159).  According to Benjamin (1990), intersubjectivity “refers to that zone of experience or 
theory in which the other is not merely the object of the ego’s need/drive or cognition/perception, 
but has a separate and equivalent center of self” (p. 186).  Stolorow and his colleagues view 
intersubjectivity as the intersection of two subjectivities and inherent to all relationships, whereas 
Benjamin views intersubjectivity as the capacity for mutual recognition and as a developmental 
achievement (Mitchell & Aron, 1990, p. 183). 
In the paper, Recognition and Destruction: An Outline of Intersubjectivity Benjamin 
(1990) links feminist theory with contemporary developmental psychoanalysis and seeks to 
understand how the meeting of two subjectivities is different from the meeting of a subject and 
an object (p. 185).   Benjamin critiques the traditional psychoanalytic theories of development 
that portrayed the mother as a mere object, her sole purpose being the fulfillment of the child’s 
needs (Aron, 1991, p. 245).  Benjamin argues that the term “object” robs the mother of her own 
subjectivity and suggests that a relational theory of psychoanalysis should aim to repair 
traditional psychoanalysis’ problematic tendency to reduce the other to simply an object. In 
Benjamin’s intersubjective developmental theory, the child’s recognition of the mother’s 
subjectivity is conceived of as a developmental achievement (p. 186).  She declares, “where 
objects were, subjects must be” (1990, p. 184).     
Drawing upon Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Benjamin (1990) asserts: “The need for 
recognition entails this fundamental paradox: in the very moment of realizing our own 
independent will, we are dependent upon another to recognize it” (p. 190).  We become self-
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conscious of our own subjectivity through the process of being recognized by another subject.  In 
being recognized by another subject we, in turn, recognize the other’s subjectivity:   
Intersubjective theory postulates that the other must be recognized as another subject in order 
for the self to fully experience his or her subjectivity in the other’s presence.  This means, 
first, that we have a need for recognition and second, a capacity to recognize others in return 
– mutual recognition.  (Benjamin, 1990, p. 186)   
The subject (child) looks to another subject (caregiver) to confirm his/her independent will.  The 
recognizing subject (caregiver) “tells us we have created meaning, had an impact, revealed an 
intention” (p. 186).  At the very moment we receive confirmation of our own independent will, 
we paradoxically recognize that there are other subjects out there with “separate center[s] of 
feeling and perception” (Benjamin, 2004, p. 5).    
Referencing Winnicott’s theory of “object usage,” the process by which the child 
recognizes the object as a separate person through first attempting to destroy the object before 
surrendering to it, Benjamin “demonstrate[s] the need for both recognition and negation in the 
establishment of human subjectivity” (Mitchell & Aron, 1999, p. 183).  From an intersubjective 
position, Benjamin (1990) resolves the paradox of recognition by arguing that the need to assert 
the self and be recognized by the other can coexist in dialectical tension (p. 191).   
For Benjamin, experiencing our own subjectivity and having the capacity to recognize others 
as subjects are mutually dependent experiences.  It is through a process of mutual recognition 
that we are both recognized and recognize others.  Benjamin re-conceptualizes the 
rapprochement phase of development as not only an achievement of separation-individuation but 
also an experience of connection, mutual recognition, and attachment.  Benjamin’s (2004) 
conception of intersubjectivity underscores, “both developmentally and clinically, how we 
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actually come to the felt experience of the other as a separate yet connected being with whom we 
are acting reciprocally” (p. 6).  
Infant research and developmental attachment theory profoundly influenced Benjamin’s and 
other relational psychoanalytic theorists’ construction of intersubjectivity.  Researchers such as 
Beebe, Stern, Lichtenberg, Fosshage, and Lachmann have shown that the infant’s mind does not 
develop in isolation but rather in a shared relational matrix with the primary caregiver 
(Lachmann, 2001).  The field of infant research has provided empirical evidence that supports 
Winnicott’s famous statement, “There is no such thing as an infant.”   Winnicott, considered by 
many an early relational theorist (Berzoff, 2011; Mitchell, 1988), understood the identity of the 
mother-infant unit as preceding the individual identity of the infant (Ben-Shahar, 2010, p. 42).  
Ogden (1994) suggests that Winnicott intentionally left his statement incomplete: “[Winnicott] 
assumes that it will be understood that the idea that there is no such thing as an infant is playfully 
hyperbolic and represents one element of a larger paradoxical statement” (p. 463).  There is, of 
course, a physically and psychologically distinct mother and distinct infant.  Ogden (1994) 
continues, “The mother-infant unity coexists in dynamic tension with the mother and infant in 
their separateness” (p. 463).   
Infant research has demonstrated that the infant is constantly “coconstructing its world in 
interaction with its environment” (Lachmann, 2001, p. 168).  It is not only the caregiver’s 
subjectivity influencing the infants, but also the infant’s subjectivity influencing the caregiver: 
“Both engage in a relational dance in which each regulates the other’s emotions in verbal and 
nonverbal ways” (Berzoff, 2011, p. 234).   The intersubjective perspective on the mother-infant 
dyad has profoundly altered the way contemporary relational theorists understand and relate to 
the therapist-client dyad.   
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Just as the intersubjectivity of the mother-infant dyad coexists in dynamic tension with the 
mother and the infant as separate and distinct individuals so too does the intersubjectivity of the 
therapist-client dyad coexist in dialectical relation with the therapist and clients’ separate 
individual identities (Ogden, 1994, p. 463).   No longer is the therapeutic process conceptualized 
as taking place within an individual or between a subject and an object, but rather as between 
two subjectivities (Benjamin, 1990, p. 184).  Aron (1991) applied Benjamin’s intersubjective 
developmental perspective to the therapeutic dyad:  
Just as psychoanalytic theory has focused on the mother exclusively as the object of the 
infant’s needs while ignoring the subjectivity of the mother, so, too, psychoanalysis has 
considered analysts only as objects while neglecting the subjectivity of analysts as they are 
experienced by the patient. (p. 247)   
Aron (1999) argues that the client’s sense of the therapist’s very real subjectivity should not be 
denied.  Through recognizing the therapist’s subjective presence, the client comes into contact 
with her own subjectivity.   
Transference and countertransference. 
In Freud’s original model of psychoanalysis, the therapist was viewed as an objective 
scientific observer working with technical neutrality to understand his subject of inquiry, the 
client (Aron, 1991, p. 247).  The ideal analyst was akin to a blank screen onto which the client 
projected his/her thoughts, feelings, and fantasies.  This construction of 
transference/countertransference “gave the analyst the illusion of order” (Ben-Shahar, 2010, p. 
41).   
The intersubjective perspective has transformed our understanding of transference and 
countertransference.  Transference is no longer viewed as the client’s misconceptions about the 
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therapeutic relationship based on past experience.  Rather, transference is understood as an 
intermingling of past and present.  Merton Gill’s (1994) reformulation of transference greatly 
influenced how contemporary relational theorists came to understand the 
transference/countertransference dynamic (Aron & Lechich, 2012, p. 214).  Gill (1994) observes:  
Instead of being defined as the distortion of the analysand’s experience of an objective 
analyst as a result of the analysand’s accustomed patterns of interpersonal relationships, 
transference becomes the analysand’s plausible experience of the relationship.  It is based 
on the contributions of both participants to the here-and-now interaction as well as on 
their respective past experiences.  Analogously, the countertransference is the analyst’s 
experience of the relationship based on the contributions of both participants to the here-
and-now interaction as well as on their respective past experiences. (p. 156) 
Transference and countertransference are not rooted solely in the past nor are they representative 
exclusively of the present but rather exist between the two.   
Instead of being viewed as a barrier to or interference with treatment, the therapist’s 
unconscious thoughts, feelings and fantasies have been reconceptualized as a clinical tool: a 
place from which to uncover information that may be relevant to the analysis (Aron, 1991, p. 
248; Ben-Shahar, 2010, p. 41).  From a relational perspective, the dichotomy between 
transference and countertransference is a false one.  Transference and countertransference are 
viewed as interdependent; the therapist’s subjectivity and the client’s subjectivity mutually 
influencing one another in a co-constructed interaction. 
The analytic third. 
As the field of clinical inquiry has expanded its boundaries to include not only the 
subjectivity of the client but also the subjectivity of the therapist, as well as the interaction 
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between the two, many theorists have explored the concept of a three-person psychology, a third 
space, or a third subjectivity: “a realm that transcends the subjectivities of the two participants” 
(Gerson, 2004, p. 75).  Thomas Ogden (2004) introduced the concept of the analytic third to the 
field of psychoanalysis.  Ogden (2004) describes the analytic third as, “the experience of being 
simultaneously within and outside of the intersubjectivity of the analyst-analysand” (p. 463) and 
a little later as, “a product of a unique dialectic generated by (between) the separate subjectivities 
of analyst and analysand within the analytic setting” (p. 464). 
Similar to the discussion around intersubjectivity, there is no singular agreed-upon 
definition of thirdness in the psychoanalytic literature.  A number of psychoanalytic theorists 
across a variety of psychoanalytic orientations have explored the concept of the third thereby 
developing a wide array of theoretical perspectives as to what constitutes thirdness.   
Consequently, the third has taken on a variety of contradictory and ambiguous meanings 
(Gerson, 2004; Aron, 2006; Aron & Lechich, 2012; Benjamin, 2004).    Gerson (2004) observes: 
For some, this something called a third that transcends individualities is thought of as a 
product of an interaction between persons; others speak of it as a context that originates apart 
from us even as it binds us together; and there are some for whom the third is a 
developmental achievement that creates a location permitting reflective observation of lived 
experience, be it singular or communal. (p. 64)   
A detailed analysis of the varied conceptions of thirdness that exist in psychoanalysis is beyond 
the bounds of this paper.  I will focus on Benjamin’s (1994; 2004) definition of a shared third 
followed by Rappoport’s (2012) extension of a somatic third.  
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Complementarity and enactment. 
As with all dyadic relationships, the intersubjective clinician/client relationship often 
becomes stuck in complementary interactions, which can evolve into impasses and enactments.  
Aron (2006) recommends thinking about “The structure of complementarity…as a straight line” 
(p. 354) and provides the metaphor of a seesaw to explain the linear configuration of a 
complementary dyadic relationship.  If the dyad wants to remain on the seesaw they have only so 
many options for relating to one another.  They can go up and down, they can move along the 
length of the seesaw closer and further apart, or they can switch places, reversing positions.  
Without a third point of view, both members of the dyad remain unaware that they are on a 
seesaw in the first place and thus unaware that they can get off it, i.e. relate to one another in a 
nonlinear fashion.  In articulating the constraints of complementarity, Aron (2006) states:  
For a couple, a therapist and patient dyad for example, this means that the structure of 
complementarity keeps them locked into a relational positioning in regard to each other 
so that one member is diametrically opposite to the other in some significant respect. (p. 
354) 
In a complementary relationship roles can be reversed but the structural organization of the 
relationship remains intact.  Examples of complementary roles are subject/object, giver/taker, 
doer/done to, powerful/powerless (Benjamin, 1990).  Complementarity is thus problematic 
because it keeps the client/clinician trapped in one pattern of relating, a pattern that may be an 
enactment.  In contemporary relational theory enactments are understood as, “the unique way in 
which the analyst is affectively pulled into and discovers him or herself as a participant in the 
patient’s relational matrix in ways that the analyst had not predicted and might not recognize 
until later” (Aron & Lechich, 2012, p. p. 219).  In relational practice, enactments are an 
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inevitable component of the therapeutic work.  Unpacking enactments, bringing the unconscious 
interactive elements of the therapist-client relationship into conscious focus, is considered to be 
at the core of clinical work (Berzoff, 2011, p. 223).  
Jessica Benjamin’s third. 
In her seminal article, Beyond Doer and Done To: An Intersubjective View of Thirdness, 
Benjamin (2004) explains how the third enables the dyad to move beyond limiting 
complementary interactions.  As opposed to Hegel’s master slave dialectic in which the struggle 
for recognition must end in either destruction or unification, Benjamin (1990) proposes that 
instead of resolving the contradiction of mutual recognition we hold it in paradoxical tension 
through the intersubjective position of thirdness (p. 190).  
Surrendering to the third. 
Benjamin’s conception of thirdness is an expansion on Ghent’s notion of surrender.  In 
Masochism, Submission, Surrender – Masochism as a Perversion of Surrender, Ghent (1990) 
makes a distinction between submission and surrender.  He proposes that masochism is the 
perversion of a desire to surrender to one’s true self.  In Ghent’s (1990) seminal paper he argues 
that, in some instances, the masochistic desire to submit to the power or control of a sadistic 
other is a perversion of a deeper desire to surrender to a true self.  Ghent suggests that “however 
deeply buried or frozen” (p. 109), human beings have a wish to give up their false selves and that 
this wish is part of “an even more general longing to be known, recognized” (p. 111).  Ghent 
defines this longing for surrender as, “ the wish to be found, recognized, penetrated to the core, 
so as to become real, or as Winnicott put it in another context ‘to come into being’” (p. 122).  
Ghent points out that whereas in the West the word surrender has connoted defeat, in the East 
surrender is more closely related to transcendence and liberation (p. 111).   
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In articulating the difference between submission and surrender, Ghent (1990) lays out 
some of the central features of surrender, of which I will highlight three.  First, Ghent notes that 
one does not surrender “to another” but rather, “in the presence of another.”  Second, Ghent 
describes surrendering as “an experience of being ‘in the moment,’ totally in the present, where 
past and future, the two tenses that require ‘mind’ in the sense of secondary processes, have 
receded from consciousness.”  Third, Ghent highlights that surrender’s “ultimate direction is the 
discovery of one’s identity, one’s sense of self, one’s sense of wholeness, even one’s sense of 
unity with other living beings” (p. 111).   
Benjamin interpreted Ghent’s concept of surrendering in the presence of another as a 
“letting go into being with them” (p. 8).  If we are not surrendering to another person, then what 
are we surrendering to?  For Benjamin, we are surrendering to the third.  She (2004) explains:  
Elaborating this idea, we might say that the third is that to which we surrender, and 
thirdness is the intersubjective mental space that facilitates or results from surrender.  In 
my thinking, the term surrender refers to a certain letting go of the self, and thus also 
implies the ability to take in the other’s point of view or reality.  Thus, surrender refers us 
to recognition – being able to sustain connectedness to the other’s mind while accepting 
his separateness and difference.  Surrender implies freedom from any intent to control or 
coerce. (p. 8)   
For Benjamin, the third is conceived of as a principle rather than a rule of technique.  Benjamin 
(2004) notes, “My aim is to distinguish it from superego maxims or ideals that the analyst holds 
onto with her ego, often clutching them as a drowning person clutches a straw” (p. 7).  It is in 
this way that Benjamin views her conception of thirdness as an expansion of Ghent’s (1990) 
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concept of surrender.  In the intersubjective matrix, we are not holding onto a third but rather 
surrendering to it (p. 8).  
The one-in-third and the third-in-the-one. 
Benjamin (2004) describes “different aspects of thirdness” making a distinction between the 
one-in-third and the third-in-the-one; separate yet interconnected attributes of the shared third 
(Aron, 2006, p. 356).  Further complicating the matter, Benjamin, and other theorists who have 
developed Benjamin’s ideas, have referred to the one-in-the-third and the third-in-the-one by a 
number of other names.   The one-in-the-third has been described as the nascent, energetic, 
rhythmic, and primordial third whereas the third-in-the-one has been described as the moral third 
and the intentional third (Aron, 2006; Benjamin, 2004).   
Benjamin (2004) defines the third-in-the-one as, “This ability to maintain internal awareness, 
to sustain the tension of difference between my needs and yours while still being attuned to you” 
(p. 13).  Benjamin used the mother-infant dyad to expound on the third-in-the-one.  Within the 
mother-infant relationship, the mother’s subjective awareness of herself as separate and distinct 
from the infant is the third-in-the-one.  The third-in-the-one, the intentional third, “facilitates the 
differentiation of the self and other within their very connectedness” (Aron, 2006, p. 358).   
The one-in-the-third describes the experience of being one with another person (Aron, 2006, 
p. 356).    In Benjamin’s (2004) words, “literally the part of the third that is constituted by 
oneness” (p. 17).  The infant is, at first, unaware of him/herself as separate from the mother.  The 
mother, although able to maintain awareness of herself as a separate and distinct being also, at 
times, gets lost in the experience of being one with her infant: the mother is “split between two 
subjective positions, one aligned with the child and one distinct and marked” (Aron, 2006, 358).  
The mother and infant establish a pattern of interacting with one another that exists solely 
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between them and is created by them.  Aron (2006) depicts the one-in-the-third as the rhythm 
established between the mother-infant dyad through “eye gaze, reciprocal speech, gestures, 
movements, and mutual mirroring” (p. 356).   
Benjamin (2004) uses the example of jazz musicians improvising with one another to give 
life to the concept of the one-in-the-third.  Jazz musicians, who have improvised with one 
another for many years, can communicate without exchanging words, gestures, or even glances 
but simply through their felt-sense of one another.  When lost in an improvisational riff, the 
musicians have no clear leader or follower.  Rather, they seamlessly move in and out of 
following and leading, without conscious awareness of this process.  Benjamin (2004) describes 
this occurrence as a “nonverbal experience of sharing a pattern, a dance, with another person” (p. 
16).   
Growing up, I took an improvisational dance class from the age of 8 till 18.  Almost all of the 
girls in the class started together in elementary school and finished together at the end of high 
school.  Early on, our teacher taught us an exercise, called Mirror, in which we would line up 
facing each other.  The girl standing across from you was your partner.  The exercise started with 
one partner, identified as the leader, making slow improvisational movements.  The other 
partner, identified as the follower, would mirror the movement in present time.  After five or so 
minutes, we would change roles, the mirror becoming the leader and the leader the mirror.  We 
would then begin the exercise a third time, without establishing who would lead and who would 
mirror.  Through close observation of one another, we would establish a shared space in which 
we moved together, at times lost in a rhythmic pattern of relating, both simultaneously leading 
and mirroring.   Over the years as we grew older, we continued with this exercise.  By the time 
we got to high school we had become so attuned with one another that we would quickly fall into 
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a pattern of moving together in which there was no clear leader or follower.  This space, in which 
two people dance together, seamlessly passing the role of leader and follower back and forth 
without any pre-established understanding, is the space of the rhythmic or energetic third.  It is 
the union created when two (or more) people are affectively resonating with one another 
(Benjamin, 2004, p. 17).  It is the space within which resonance emerges.  Thus the principle of 
the one-in-the-third or the rhythmic third is closely related to the experience of somatic or 
affective resonance.   
Bringing together the one-in-the-third and the-third-in-the-one Benjamin (2004) 
conceptualizes a shared third.  Benjamin (2004) explains the shared third as:   
Establishing a co-created rhythm that is not reducible to a model of action-reaction, with one 
active and the other passive or one leading and the other following.  Action-reaction 
characterizes our experience of complementary twoness, the one-way direction; by contrast, 
a shared third is experienced as a cooperative endeavor. (p. 18)   
The shared third is thus understood as an intersubjective space in which two people are able to 
get lost in a co-created rhythm of relating while at the same time maintain their subjective 
awareness of themselves as existing outside of the co-created rhythm.   
The somatic third. 
 
In her article entitled, “Creating the Umbilical Cord: Relational Knowing and the 
Somatic Third”, Evelyn Rappoport (2012) introduces the term, somatic third, as an expansion of 
Benjamin’s rhythmic third.  The somatic third is defined as, “the space of physical resonance and 
interactive sensory regulation” (p. 384).  Rappaport suggests that it is helpful to conceptualize 
the somatic third as “expanding the boundaries of the relational work, with an approach informed 
by the data recently available from the neurosciences” (p. 384).  
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The somatic third is the space within which nonverbal communication takes place as well 
as a form of nonverbal bodily-based communication.  It is the space within which therapists and 
clients empathically resonate with one another on an embodied level.  Through clinical case 
material Rappoport (2012) explains how the somatic third is created between and within two 
bodies as well as how awareness of the somatic third, on the part of the clinician, contributes to 
healing in the therapeutic dyad.   
Benjamin (2004) describes the rhythmic third is a space of affective resonance - empathic 
emotional connection - between and within two minds.  Rappaport argues that by working 
directly with the body, therapist and client can resonate with one another in the space of the 
somatic third thereby expanding their ability to affectively resonate with one another in the space 
of the rhythmic third.  
In accessing the somatic third, Rappoport (2012) describes, “Working with the body 
more directly and actively, with awareness and intention” which results in a “linking of affect 
and soma” (p. 384).  Rappaport draws upon techniques from somatic experiencing to access the 
somatic third.  Rappaport argues that consciously bringing the body into the treatment 
relationship changes the shared space, the energetic third, between therapist and client.  In 
discussing the effects of a co-created somatic third between herself and the client whose case 
material she presents in her article, Rappaport (2012) observes:  
As the felt sense experience flows between us, mutual recognition is felt and recognized, 
with each of us viscerally influencing the other.  Together we begin to function as 
mutually enlivening subjects who meet in the space of the analytic third, ‘outside the two, 
but connected to both.’ (p. 385) 
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Citing Eldridge & Cole (2008), Rappaport (2012) suggests that when the therapist shifts 
the focus of the work away from meaning making and toward an awareness of bodily sensations, 
meaning will often “emerge organically from the intersubjective space” (p. 384).  It is worth 
acknowledging that Rappaport does not value an embodied felt sense over meaning making, 
which is considered the central tenant of psychoanalytic work.  Instead, she suggests that 
embodied self-awareness on a visceral, sensory level is the foundation for meaning making and 
leads us towards it.   
Rappaport clearly demonstrates how working with the rhythmic third and further, the 
somatic third, enlivens the therapeutic encounter. It is my contention that relational body 
psychotherapists (Ben-Shahar, 2012; Diamond, 2001; Hricko, 2011; Shaw, 2003; Stone, 2006) 
are articulating a similar experience of attunement when they refer to, somatic resonance and 
embodied resonance.  Hricko (2011), citing Shaw (2003) defined somatic resonance as, 
“empathic resonance that occurs body to body and includes the energetic inter-subjective space 
between client and therapist” (p. 25).  Ben-Shahar (2012), citing Schafer (1992) and Turp (2000) 
states, “somatic resonance allows us to connect to the shared field in an attuned manner, 
responding to a showing not yet a telling” (p. 14).   Reading Hricko and Ben-Shahar’s definitions 
of somatic resonance, it is easy to see the connection to Rappaport’s concept of the somatic third.  
In the discussion chapter I return to the theoretical concepts reviewed in this chapter, 
further connecting the intersubjective context of clinical work to the embodied dimension.  In the 
next chapter I explore how research findings and theoretical concepts from the field of 
interpersonal neurobiology support relational psychoanalysis’ intersubjective conceptualization 
of both human development and clinical practice.  Further, I demonstrate that the mind is no 
longer understood as existing in the head-based brain but throughout the body.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Interpersonal Neurobiology 
 
“when we interact, we are impacting each other’s internal biological state and influencing the 
long-term construction of each other’s brains.  This, in essence, is how love becomes flesh.”         
 
- Louis Cozolino (2014, p. xv) 
 
 
During the last two decades the neurosciences have produced a wide breadth of research that 
is consonant with and can enhance the perspective of relational psychoanalysis.  The findings of 
interpersonal neurobiology support two basic principles explored in this paper: that we are social 
beings, created through the process of being in relationship with one another, and that embodied 
self-awareness is a vital component of an integrated sense of self (Carroll & Orbach, 2006).  In 
this chapter I explore key concepts from the field of interpersonal neurobiology that inform an 
embodied intersubjective perspective on clinical process and context.  I begin with a brief 
overview of the field, followed by an in-depth description of Daniel Siegel’s embodied and 
embedded mind.  I then turn my attention to the preverbal embodied relational experience of 
early life and the emotion-processing, bodily-based right-hemisphere of the brain.  I touch upon 
the relevance of mirror neurons and conclude with a discussion of the Boston Change Process 
Study Group’s concept of implicit relational knowing. 
Since the decade of the brain (1995-2005), the integrative interdisciplinary field of 
interpersonal neurobiology has emerged.   Interpersonal neurobiology draws from a wide range 
of disciplines within the biological and social sciences including anthropology, biology, 
cognitive science, genetics, linguistics, mathematics, physics, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, 
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systems theory and, of course, neuroscience (Siegel, 2012).   Similar to the relational matrix this 
interdisciplinary field can best be conceptualized as a broad tent encapsulating a variety of 
subfields.   Some of the subfields that have emerged include contemporary developmental 
neuroscience, modern or relational neuropsychoanalysis, regulation theory, and developmental 
affective neuroscience (J. Schore, 2012, p. 90).  Technological advances in brain imaging (i.e. 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET)) have made it 
possible to study the inner workings of the brain and thus led to a surge of research in these 
fields (A. N. Schore, 2012; Marks-Tarlow, 2012).  Developmental neuroscientists are studying 
how early affective relational patterns literally shape the right hemisphere of the developing 
brain.  Interpersonal neurobiologists such as Siegel (2012), A. N. Schore (2012), and Marks-
Tarlow (2012) are developing theoretical models based on this research as well as considering 
how this research relates to psychodynamic theory. 
Interpersonal Neurobiology is concerned with human experience, the nature of mind and 
mental well-being, and the interconnectedness of the brain-mind-body with relationships (Siegel, 
2012; Marks-Tarlow, 2012).  According to Cozolino (2014), “At the core of interpersonal 
neurobiology is a focus on the neural systems that organize attachment, emotion, attunement, and 
social communication” (p. xvii).  As previously discussed in the introduction to this paper, A. N. 
Schore (2009a, 2009b, 2012) has enthusiastically argued that we are in the midst of a paradigm 
shift evidenced by a changing focus in both theory and research across the social sciences.  A. N. 
Schore (2012) remarks, “Neuroscience is transitioning from studies of left brain language-based 
cognitive processes and voluntary motor functions to studies of the embodied functions of the 
right-lateralized emotion-processing limbic system and stress-regulating HPA [hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal] axis” (p. 5).   
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The Embodied and Relational Mind 
 
Interpersonal neurobiologists are re-exploring the Cartesian mind/body divide that has 
long plagued philosophers and psychologists alike (A. N. Schore, 2012; Siegel, 2012).  The 
question of what the mind actually is and where it resides proves to be quite elusive.  Siegel 
(2012) has developed a model of the mind that is understood as “both embodied in an internal 
physiological context and embedded in an external relational context” (p. XXV).  Instead of 
existing solely within the “head-brain,” the mind is conceived of as existing throughout the entire 
body as well as between people.   
Siegel (2012) views the mind as an emergent process; the mind arises out of an 
interaction of elements within a complex system.  The complex system the mind emerges from is 
a flow of energy and information circulated throughout the body and exchanged in interpersonal 
relationships (Siegel, 2012, p. 1-6).   The mind is thus understood as an evolving process that 
exists within and between two or more brain-mind-bodies.  Siegel (2012) provides the following 
working definition of the mind: “A core aspect of the mind can be defined as an embodied and 
relational process that regulates the flow of energy and information” (p. XXVI). 
Siegel (2012) uses the term brain to describe “the extended nervous system distributed 
throughout the whole body” (p. 4).  Traditionally, the term brain has referred to the cluster of 
cells contained within the skull, the command center of the central nervous system.  However, 
research from the neurosciences continues to demonstrate that the skull-based cluster of cells we 
generally refer to as the brain is “inextricably interconnected with the whole of the body through 
the peripheral nervous system and all the signals from the body’s physiological processes” (p. 3).  
That is, the “head-brain” relies on input from the extended nervous system, located throughout 
the entire body, in order to function.   
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Within Siegel’s model, the brain is conceived of as an embodied neural mechanism 
contained within both the body proper and the cluster of cells in the “head-brain” (p. 3-2).  The 
brain is thus the structure within which the energy that is mind flows.  Siegel (2001) explains: 
The reality appears to be that the processes of the mind emanate from the structure and 
function of the brain.  The brain itself is an integral part of the central nervous system, 
which is fundamentally interwoven within the whole body.  Thus, though we may speak 
of the mind as emanating from the neurophysiological processes of the brain, this 
statement is an abbreviated way of referring to the flow of energy and information within 
the brain as a fundamental part of the functioning of the body as a whole.  The patterns in 
the flow of energy and information, the essence of the mind, are a product of both bodily 
(neurophysiological) processes and interpersonal interactions. (p. 70) 
Siegel is using the term brain to refer to both the central nervous system and the peripheral 
nervous system, both the brain in the head and the brain in the body.  Instead of referring to a 
brain-body-mind, Siegel uses the shorthand brain-mind.  Although I believe Siegel is attempting 
to simplify things, I think that this use of the term brain is confusing simply because “brain” has 
historically referred to the organ of soft nervous tissue contained within the skull.  For this 
reason I think it makes more sense to use the term brain-body-mind as opposed to brain-mind 
when referring to the complex system that makes up a human being.    
Influenced by systems-theory, Siegel (2012) argues that a core feature of the mind is its 
ability to self-regulate the complex system that it both exists within and emerges from.  The 
mind not only arises from a flow of energy and information in an embodied and relational 
system, but it also regulates that same flow of energy and information.  Energy is the thing that 
the mind both emerges out of and regulates.  Siegel (2012) defines energy as “a potential to 
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create, to induce movement, change, or action” and information as “a swirl of energy with 
meaning, a pattern of energy that symbolizes something other than itself” (p. 1-8).  Within the 
brain-body-mind, neural firing patterns carry electrochemical energy.  How energy is carried 
between people is not as well understood by science.  Siegel suggests that the flow of energy and 
information, both within and between people, may ultimately be what gives rise to subjective 
experience, consciousness, and mental activities such as emotion, thinking, and memory (p. 1-9).  
The mind, brain-body, and relationships are an interconnected system.  According to 
Siegel (2012):  
We do not need to separate the two – each is a fundamental part of what the mind is and 
where the mind resides.  The system we are focusing on is not brain[body] or 
relationships – it is a system that entails the flow of energy and information within the 
brain[body] and between one another.  (p. 1-8, 1-9)   
Conceptualizing the mind as an embodied and relational process helps us to recognize the 
embodied self-awareness of the client, the embodied self-awareness of the therapist, and the 
relationship between the two as imperative to clinical work.   If we think of the brain as a neural-
network that exists throughout the entire body, the relevance of bodily awareness to mental well-
being and clinical work becomes obvious.   
The client/therapist dyad is not only co-creating an intersubjective third space but they 
are also co-creating a joint mind that exists between them.  The client and therapist’s separate 
embodied minds create and regulate the intersubjective mind.  At the same time, the 
intersubjective mind influences and regulates the client and therapist’s separate embodied minds.  
This is how mutual regulation occurs in a dyadic relationship.  Just as an individual brain-mind-
body has the capacity to regulate the complex system it emerges out of, so too the intersubjective 
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brain-mind-body has the capacity to mutually regulate the complex system that is the 
client/therapist relationship. Ben-Shahar (2014) observes: 
When a therapist and client sit together in the clinic, mind is neither merely an object, 
nor simply a separated subject; instead, mind is an intersubjective process, inclusive of 
the therapist and client, the processes that take place within them and between them – it is 
a wider mind. (p. 101)   
By describing the intersubjective mind as a wider mind, a term Ben-Shahar borrows from the 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson, Ben-Shahar is introducing the holistic perspective of body 
psychotherapy, mainly that the intersubjective mind is greater than the sum of its parts.   
Siegel (2012) contends that the principle of integration is what defines health.  From an 
interpersonal neurobiology perspective, human beings are seen as naturally inclined toward 
integration.  Impaired mental health is seen as a lack of integration between brain-body-mind and 
relationships and is understood as caused by a combination of genetic, experiential, and chance 
factors.  Psychotherapy is viewed as a process or movement toward greater integration (Siegel, 
2012, p. 4-6).   
If we accept that, as clinicians, part of our job is to assist our clients in moving toward 
greater integration (health), and also accept that the brain is more accurately understood as 
located throughout the wider nervous system of the body, it is essential that we incorporate 
embodied self-awareness into mental health practices.  Further, Siegel’s model of an embodied 
mind helps us to understand why the body must be centrally involved in the 
transference/countertransference discussion. 
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The Preverbal Relational Matrix of Early Life and Regulation Theory 
Drawing upon the findings of modern attachment theory and developmental research, 
interpersonal neurobiology posits that over the first two years of life the right hemisphere of the 
brain develops in a preverbal relational matrix with the primary caregiver.  Modern attachment 
theory, building on Bowlby’s (1969) original attachment model, and supported by research in 
interpersonal and developmental neuroscience, tells us that our earliest experience of being alive 
is a preverbal, bodily-based, right brain experience.  According to A. N. Schore & Schore 
(2012), “for the rest of the life span, attachment processes lie at the center of all human 
emotional and social functions” (p. 27).  
The integrative research of Allen Schore (2003, 2012) has been instrumental in revealing 
connections between infant attachment and affect regulation, and the development of the mind-
brain-body.  A. N. Schore has proposed that modern attachment theory is essentially a theory of 
regulation.  In an article entitled Modern Attachment Theory: The Central Role of Affect 
Regulation in Development and Treatment, A. N. Schore and Schore (2008) presented regulation 
theory as a modern update of attachment theory:  
…as a result of interdisciplinary developmental and neurobiological research over the last 15 
years Bowlby’s core ideas have been expanded into a more complex and clinically relevant 
model.  We will argue that at this point in time, any theory of development and its 
corresponding theory of therapy must include these psychobiological findings regarding 
precisely how early emotional transactions with the primary object impact the development 
of psychic structure, that is, how affective attachment communications facilitate the 
maturation of brain systems involved in affect and self regulation. (p. 10)  
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According to A. N. Schore (2012), regulation theory highlights three major themes: that 
experiences in the first two years of life significantly influence the developing structure of the 
brain, that bodily-based emotion is essential to a fuller understanding of the human condition, 
and that, right brain implicit unconscious processes are dominant over the course of the lifespan 
(p. 1, 2).   
Before the left-brain has formed, before we are able to think symbolically, we come to know 
ourselves through the context of a bodily-based relationship with a primary caregiver:  “The 
individual is seen to ‘emerge out’ of a relationship with a significant ‘other’” (Marks-Tarlow, 
2014, p. 220). The newborn infant is not conscious of itself as separate from the primary 
caregiver.  According to Fogel (2009), “Self-awareness in early infancy has no concept of ‘me’ 
and ‘you’ as separate beings” (p. 20, 21).  
The primary caregiver interprets the infant’s bodily-based sensations as specific feelings or 
needs thus making sense of the infant’s internal world before the infant is able to do so for itself.  
The crying infant does not know what it is crying for.  It is the attuned caregiver who interprets 
the infant’s cry as that of a specific feeling or need, i.e. hunger, sleepiness, etc.  The infant thus 
develops the ability to make sense of his/her own bodily-bases sensations as specific feelings.   It 
is the attuned caregiver’s understanding and responsiveness, communicated in part through the 
handling and holding of the infant’s body that develops into self-care and emotional regulation 
(J. Schore, 2012, p. 107).  Right brain to right brain non-verbal communication between infant 
and caregiver shapes the infant’s sense of self and internal working models of relationships 
(Marks-Tarlow, 2012, p. 22).  Modern infant attachment research is reminiscent of Winnicott’s 
famous statement, “There is no such thing as a baby,” and supports relational psychoanalysis’ 
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understanding of the infant as primarily object seeking, as opposed to drive driven (J. Schore, 
2012, p. 107).  
The Emotion-Processing, Bodily-Based Right-Hemisphere of the Brain 
The command center of the brain consists of the right and left hemispheres, divided by the 
corpus callosum, the part of the brain responsible for neural integration of the two hemispheres. 
The relationship of the right and left hemispheres is not dissimilar to Freud’s conceptualization 
of the conscious and unconscious mind.  A. N. Schore (2003) has described the right hemisphere 
as the “biological substrate of the human unconscious.”   
The right hemisphere is the home of a “motivationally informed emotion-processing 
unconscious” that develops out of the infant’s earliest relational environment (J. Schore, 2012, p. 
107).  The left hemisphere begins to ascend at around 18 months, becoming prominent at 3 
years.  Thus, the right hemisphere of the brain is dominant during the first two years of life (J. 
Schore, 2012; Marks-Tarlow, 2012; Fogel, 2009).  The infant begins to develop embodied self-
awareness in the first three years of life through interpersonal interactions with its primary 
caregiver.  As the left hemisphere, conceptual self-awareness, has yet to develop during the first 
two-years of life, the infant’s sense of self is “nonconceptual and nonlinguistic” (Fogel, 2009, p. 
20).  
Right and Left Brain: Different Perspectives on the World 
While the two hemispheres of the brain were once understood as specialized in performing 
different tasks, brain laterality researchers now conceptualize the right and left hemispheres as 
having “different perspectives on the world” (Marks-Tarlow, 2012, p. 15).  Whereas the left 
hemisphere is considered the home of conscious, rational, linear thinking, the right hemisphere is 
the realm of nonconscious, holistic, subjective emotional nonlinear experience (Marks-Tarlow, 
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2014, p. 220; A. N. Schore, 2012, p. 7).  Within the literature of interpersonal neurobiology, as 
well as other related fields, the term nonconscious is used to distinguish between Freud’s 
dynamic unconscious and other aspects of experiential knowledge that remain outside of explicit, 
left-hemisphere conscious processing but that are not necessarily repressed or defended against 
(A. N. Schore, 2012).  However, unconscious and nonconscious are still often used 
interchangeably.   
According to Schore (2012), “We can no longer think of ‘the brain’ as two halves of a single 
entity.  Rather, these two systems process different types of information in very different ways” 
(p. 7).  The right brain processes nonverbal, implicit, procedural memory.  J. Schore (2012) 
describes the implicit memory system of the right brain, present from birth:  
[it] operates rapidly and unconsciously and is heavily connected to the autonomic nervous 
system.  It is organized to give an emotional valence to events, to detect safety and threat, 
and is subjectively experienced as emotional memory.  This earliest type of memory is right 
lateralized, unconscious, implicit, bodily-based, and emotional. (p. 95) 
The right hemisphere processes the felt sense of experience, recording affective information in 
implicit, nonconscious memory. Marks-Tarlow (2012) suggests conceiving of the left 
hemisphere as utilizing a top down approach and the right hemisphere utilizing a bottom up 
approach.  The right hemisphere of the brain is the part of the command system of the central 
nervous system that receives neural information from the body, the peripheral nervous system.  
In other words, the right hemisphere processes kinesthetic physiological information from the 
body on a nonconscious level (A. N. Schore & J. Schore, 2012).  
Marks-Tarlow (2012) uses the metaphor of mistaking the forest for the trees to explain the 
difference between the right and left hemispheres.  Whereas the right hemisphere maintains a 
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holistic expansive attention, understanding the forest as something greater than a collection of 
individual trees, the left hemisphere focuses in on the features of each individual tree (p. 15, 16).  
The left hemisphere specializes in making sense of experience by honing in on details, recording 
factual information in explicit, conscious memory through the use of symbolic, verbal thought 
processes (Marks-Tarlow, 2012; A. N. Schore, 2012).  Psychotherapy, the “talking-cure,” along 
with the wider western culture within which it was first created, has long valued the deliberate 
cognitive capacities of the left-brain over the intuitive, implicit processes of the right brain 
(Fogel, 2009).  
Mirror Neurons 
Mirror neurons can be understood as the neurological basis of empathy and affective 
resonance.   In the 1990s it was discovered that the same neurons are fired when an action is 
taken and when an action is observed (Ben-Shahar, 2014; Siegel, 2012).  The same is true 
regarding emotions.  Strait (2014) explains, “observing an emotion and experiencing an emotion 
activates the identical neural structure” (p. 316).  The fact that we neurobiologically mimic 
actions and emotions that we observe in others is scientific evidence of the fact that our nervous 
systems are affected by other people’s actions and behaviors.   Gallese, Eagle, & Migone (2007) 
use the term “embodied simulation” to refer to the process by which mirror neurons are activated 
within one person when observing another person engage in an action, or experience an emotion.   
The discovery of mirror neurons offers a neuroscientific understanding of affective 
resonance, a form of empathy (Cozolino & Santos, 2014, p. 164).  Our ability to affectively, 
empathically resonate with another person is grounded in the stimulation of mirror neurons in the 
premotor regions of our frontal lobes (Cozolino & Santos, 2014; Hopenwasser, 2008).  This 
means that, “knowing ourselves deeply supports our knowing others’ internal worlds as well” 
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(Siegel, 2012, p. 23-2).  The discovery of mirror neurons supports the concept of a co-created 
embodied intersubjective space within which our nervous systems resonate with one another.   
The Boston Change Process Study Group and Implicit Relational Knowing 
The Boston Change Process Study Group (BCPSG), created in 1995, is a group of 
psychoanalysts, developmental researchers, and psychoanalytic theorists.  BCPSG (1998a) view 
themselves as contributing to an “interdisciplinary synthesis of scientific research and clinical 
theory and observation” (p. 284).  Although they do not specifically identify themselves as 
interpersonal neurobiologists, I view their work, guided by developmental research, dynamic 
systems theory, and psychodynamic theory and practice, as closely related to the ideas explored 
in this chapter and thus chose to include a section on their work here.   
In a pivotal paper entitled, Implicit Relational Knowing: Its Role in Development and 
Psychoanalytic Treatment, BCPSG (1998a) presented their ideas on the “something more” than 
interpretation that is needed to bring about change in psychotherapy.  BCPSG uses the term 
“something more” to describe the interactional intersubjective process that catalyzes change in 
psychotherapy, as opposed to the symbolic interpretative process of making the unconscious 
conscious.  BCPSG (1998a) explains how they started down this path: 
Early in our discussions, our attention was drawn to the observation that most patients 
remember ‘special moments’ of authentic person-to-person connection with their 
therapists, moments that altered their relationship with him or her and thereby their sense 
of themselves. (p. 284)   
In an effort to develop language with which to describe this “something more,” the BCPSG 
(1998a) introduced the terms “implicit relational knowing,” “the real relationship,” and 
“moments of meeting” (p. 285).   
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BCPSG makes a distinction between two types of procedural knowledge: the procedural 
knowledge that has to do with knowing how to do something and the procedural knowledge that 
has to do with knowing information about something (Lyons-Ruth, p. 577). BCPSG breaks-
down the procedural knowledge that has to do with knowing how to do something into two 
categories.  The first category has to do with knowing how to do something such as riding a bike 
or driving a car which, “concerns knowing about interactions between our body and the 
inanimate world.”  The second category has to do with knowing how to be in relationship with 
others, such as knowing how to express affect (BCPGS, 1998b, p. 905).  For this second type of 
procedural knowing, the kind that has to do with “knowing about interpersonal and 
intersubjective relations,” BCPSG proposed the term implicit relational knowing (p. 905).    
The BCPSG emphasize that implicit relational knowing is as much affective as it is 
cognitive and can remain nonconscious, “…operate[ing] largely outside the realm of verbal 
consciousness and the dynamic unconscious” (1998a, p. 285).  The term nonconscious helps us 
to differentiate between Freud’s dynamic unconscious and a realm of experience that is not 
explicitly conscious, yet is not defended against or repressed (A. N. Schore, 2012). 
The BCPSG (1998a) goes on to note “implicit relational knowing begins to be 
represented in some yet to be known form long before the availability of language and continues 
to operate implicitly throughout life” (p. 285).  Based on the observation that infants indicate 
surprise or upset when a relational pattern of interaction is disturbed, infant researchers have 
concluded that infants anticipate relational patterns of interaction from their primary caregivers.  
This suggests that infants are employing implicit relational knowing in the first year of life.  
BCPSG (1998b) cites research studies by several members of the group (Stern, 1985, 1995; 
Sander, 1962, 1988; Tronick & Cohn, 1989; Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz, 1999) that demonstrate an 
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ongoing process of relational negotiation between the infant and the primary caregiver.  
According to BCPSG (1998b) it is the “unique configuration of adaptive strategies that emerges 
from this sequence in each individual [that] constitutes the initial organization of his/her domain 
of implicit relational knowing” (p. 905).  Similar to A. N. Schore’s (2012) theory that early 
attachment patterns and unconscious processes of the right hemisphere of the brain lie at the core 
of the self throughout the lifespan, the BCSPG (1998b) purport that various types of implicit 
relational knowings operate over the course of life, “including many of the ways of being with 
the therapist that we call transference” (p. 905, 906). 
BCPSG defines the “real relationship” as “the intersubjective field constituted by the 
intersection of the patient’s and the therapist’s implicit relational knowing” (p. 285).  The term 
“real relationship” is used to differentiate “authentic personal engagement and reasonably 
accurate sensings of each person’s current ‘ways of being with’” from the transference-
countertransference domain, as well as from the domain of verbal interpretations (p. 285).  
“Moments of meeting” are the transactional events that occur in the “real relationship” between 
therapist and client, usually involving heightened affect, that lead to new types of implicit 
relational knowing.  A “moment of meeting” requires an authentic response from the therapist, 
an affective revealing of some personal aspect of the self.  In the following quote in which 
BCPSG explain how their model is different from “traditional views,” one can see similarities 
between BCPSG’s (re)construction of psychodynamic psychotherapy with both Schore’s model 
of regulation theory and relational psychoanalysts’ focus on the here and now therapeutic 
relationship:  
In contrast to more traditional views, we feel that the real relationship is also subject to 
therapeutic change by processes that alter the intersubjective field directly.  In traditional 
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theory, interpretation is viewed as the semantic event that rearranges the patient’s 
understanding.  We propose that a ‘moment of meeting’ is the transactional event that 
rearranges the patient’s implicit relational knowing by rearranging the intersubjective 
field between patient and therapist. (BCPSG, 1998a, p. 285, 286) 
Such “moments of meeting” do not require reflection or verbalization to evoke therapeutic 
change, although both can take place after the fact.  The BCSPG suggest that it is the “moment 
of meeting” itself that brings about change in psychotherapy, not the interpretation of the 
experience.  The work of BCSPG is an example of how research from the neurosciences is being 
intertwined with aspects of psychoanalytic theory to create new theoretical models.   
Conclusion 
 
The perspective of interpersonal neurobiology supports the position of the BCPSG, the 
broader field of relational psychoanalysis, as well as the metatheory of common factors research 
regarding the therapeutic relationship as a dominant factor in the change process of 
psychotherapy.  A. N. Schore (2012) remarks upon how the current paradigm shift has both been 
influenced by psychoanalytic theory and is influencing psychoanalytic theory:  
we are now seeing a resurgence of interest in subjective implicit, unconscious functions, and 
thereby in psychoanalysis, the science of unconscious processes.  Modern psychoanalysis is 
being reenergized by advances in developmental psychoanalysis, which are describing the 
early intersubjective origins of the unconscious mind, and in neuropsychoanalysis, which are 
exploring how intersubjective communications impact internal psychic structure. (p. 13)   
I would argue that research in the neurosciences is also reenergizing the theory and practice of 
body psychotherapy through research on the embodied nature of mind and affect, as well as by 
bringing a focus on embodied awareness into mainstream dialogue.  Interpersonal 
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neurobiologists’ contention that the body-brain-mind must be conceived as and worked with as 
an integrated whole is consonant with the holistic perspective of body psychotherapists.  
A. N. Schore (2012) contends that scientists studying the brain and therapists studying 
the mind are in agreement regarding the “centrality of bodily-based affective phenomena” 
however, he highlights that a common language addressing “the subjective emotional realm” has 
yet to be established (p. 19).  In the following chapter I will braid together terminology from 
interpersonal neurobiology, relational psychoanalysis and body psychotherapy to further 
elucidate the phenomenon of embodied intersubjectivity as well as underscore Schore’s point 
about the lack of a common language to describe this realm of experience.  I will argue that part 
of what is transformative about psychotherapy is experiencing a deeper connection with one’s 
embodied sense of self and having that experience recognized, in a somatic third space, by 
another embodied being.  I will conclude by further elaborating on how this phenomenon is 
relevant to clinical social work practice.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
 
Discussion 
 
“And we cannot claim the sense of vitality that we crave unless we learn how to feel that which 
we cannot know.”                                                                                                                               
 
- Mark Epstein (2005, p. 136) 
 
Shifting Paradigms 
In this paper I have examined two parallel and intersecting paradigmatic shifts in 
psychotherapy.  The first shift, influenced by relational psychoanalysis, is a movement from a 
subject/object frame to an intersubjective frame.  The second shift, influenced by research in the 
neurosciences, is a shift in emphasis from explicit, conceptual, symbolic, left brain processes to 
implicit, bodily-based, affective, right brain processes.  Whereas content was once primary, the 
focus is now on context.  These two paradigm shifts are deeply interwoven and are continually 
altering the clinical encounter.  
When I started this project, I was naïve to the complexity of the topic.  I knew that 
exploring the phenomenon of embodied intersubjectivity meant weaving together multiple 
theories on both embodiment and intersubjectivity, but I had no idea how profoundly interlaced 
those theories would prove to be.  I planned to explain the phenomenon of embodied 
intersubjectivity with a reductionist method, examining intersubjectivity through the lens of 
relational psychoanalysis and embodiment through the lens of interpersonal neurobiology.  
However, I soon realized that embodiment and intersubjectivity are so deeply interwoven, it is 
nearly impossible to separate one from the other.  We come to embody ourselves through being 
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in relationship with others in an intersubjective context.  We relate with one another in an 
intersubjective context through our bodies.  That is to say, intersubjectivity is embodied and 
embodiment is intersubjective.  
In the previous two chapters I demonstrated that the self is no longer understood as a 
separate, fixed entity but rather a process that is co-created in relationship with others. In both 
intersubjective relational theory and interpersonal neurobiology, the self has been de-centered, 
“The field of self expanded beyond the boundaries of skin to include connections with others” 
(Ben-Shahar, 2014, p. 101).  In chapter III, I traced the paradigm shift in psychoanalysis toward 
a relational theory of mind and described how relational theorists have reimagined the clinical 
encounter as a meeting of two subjectivities.  In chapter IV, I used interpersonal neurobiology to 
demonstrate the interconnectedness of the body, mind, brain, and relationships, and highlighted 
the relevance of implicit, affective, bodily-based right-brain-to-right-brain communication in life 
and clinical work.  The interpersonal neurobiological point of view purports that we come to 
know ourselves, both developmentally and clinically, through being in relationship with others.  
A reformulation of this point of view is that we come to feel ourselves through feeling in 
relationship with others.  When we tune into our bodily felt-sense while at the same time tuning 
into the felt sense in the room, thereby picking up the felt-sense of the other, we come in contact 
with the embodied intersubjective matrix.  
I introduced this paper on a personal note, sharing my own experience as a client in 
psychotherapy.  In an article linking psychoanalysis with polarity therapy Newman (2008) 
remarks:  
 I was intrigued by the question of how [clients] could ‘know’ themselves in a more 
authentic and connected manner - less from mental ‘knowing’ and more from organic, 
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embodied ‘knowing.’  I felt certain that in order to connect more with the truth or 
‘rightness’ of an experience - even the effect of an interpretation or insight - one had to 
be centered ‘in’ one’s body. (p. 171) 
Newman’s musings reflect what I shared of my experience as a client in psychotherapy, namely, 
that when intellectual insight is paired with a bodily-based felt sense of truth, the effects of 
psychotherapy are most transformative.  In this paper I have attempted to unravel the connection 
between the bodily-based felt sense that Newman alludes to and the intersubjective nature of the 
therapeutic relationship. To connect with the truth or “rightness” of an experience, one need not 
only be centered “in” one’s own body, but also in relationship with another embodied being.  
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to discussing and synthesizing these two threads.  
The Relevance of Embodied Self-awareness to Mental Health and Wellbeing  
As touched upon in chapter II, embodied self-awareness is related to Winnicott’s notion 
of true self: an individual’s authentic, spontaneous, and creative nature.  The initial experience of 
true self is the infant’s bodily-based felt sense of some physiological impulse.  Overtime, the 
child internalizes the primary caregiver’s ability to interpret that physiological impulse as a 
specific emotion, need, or desire.  According to Winnicott’s (1965) theory, the basis of 
psychological and physiological wellbeing is the individuals’ connection to their embodied sense 
of self, from which they feel their bodily based impulses in the present moment, and out of which 
grows an authentic, true self.  Recall Mitchell’s (1992) temporal perspective that there is no core 
true self, only true or authentic experiences.   From this point of view, the ability to yield to one’s 
felt sense at any particular moment creates the possibility of authentic experiencing.  
In chapter III, I summarized Ghent’s ideas on the difference between submission and 
surrender.  Ghent (1990) describes surrender as a yearning to give up the structure of the false 
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self, as an experiential awareness of “one’s sense of wholeness” that is grounded “totally in the 
present” (p. 111).  Ben-Shahar (2014) notes that from a phenomenological perspective the world 
and thus the context of clinical work is “sensory and somatic in its essence” (p. 109).  We can 
only relate to one another in so far as we have a body to relate with.  Ben-Shahar continues, 
“Surrender… does not take place in a void, but occurs in our bodily, psychological, and 
relational organization.  The human context for such surrender is necessarily bodily” (p. 109).  
Although Ghent does not explicitly refer to embodied experience, his description of surrender 
shares similarities with Gendlin’s felt sense and Fogel’s embodied self-awareness.  Perhaps part 
of the yearning to surrender is the desire to feel oneself more fully in the subjective emotional 
present.   The kind of surrender I am thinking of is an experience of losing oneself in a felt sense 
experience of knowing.   
When the authentic true self is not encouraged, the false self develops as a defense.  In 
certain expressions of the false self the intellectual process becomes overdeveloped.  When this 
is the case, “there develops a dissociation between intellectual activity and psychosomatic 
experience” (Winnicott, 1965, p. 144).  Elaborating on Winnicott’s theory, Fogel (2009) 
comments: 
the True Self is our embodied self-awareness, our ability to stay comfortably in the chaos 
of the subjective emotional present, and to use that to inform, verify, and update our 
conceptual self-awareness….The False Self is our conceptual self-awareness in the 
condition that it becomes divorced from the regulating reassurance of embodied self-
awareness. (p. 103)  
When the true self feels threatened we automatically protect ourselves by hiding our feelings and 
impulses from others and ultimately denying them from ourselves.  A pattern of avoiding the 
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subjective emotional present develops and embodied self-awareness is suppressed.  Fogel (2009) 
defines suppression as “the loss of our ability to feel ourselves” (p. 4) and suggests that denial, 
repression, and intellectualization are all defensive versions of suppression.  Over time, 
neuromotor pathways develop “that amplify and reinforce our ability in the future to suppress 
our body states from reaching self-awareness” (Fogel, 2009, p. 102).  
A. N. Schore (2012) and Marks-Tarlow (2014) seem to be articulating a similar 
phenomenon when they refer to an overreliance on the capacities of the left hemisphere of the 
brain, disconnected from the input of the right hemisphere.  Referencing McGilchrist’s (2009) 
book, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, 
Marks-Tarlow (2012) explains that the left brain often falsely believes it is in control because it 
is the seat of conscious explicit knowledge: “it erroneously conceives of itself in charge of the 
whole, while losing sight of the less visible, body-based, integrative functions of the right” (p. 
17).  From this point of view, a false self-experience manifests when the conceptual information 
processing of the left brain is divided from the physiological information processing of the right 
brain.  From a neurobiological standpoint, it seems that the potential for true self-experience is 
located in both a connection between the left and right hemispheres of the brain, as well as a 
connection between the central nervous system of the right brain and the peripheral nervous 
system located throughout the body.  
In both chapters III and IV, I outlined how modern developmental research directly 
supports Winnicott’s notion that an experience of true self is inextricably bound up with both 
embodied self-awareness and relationships: how we inhabit our bodies, feel ourselves from the 
inside (interoception), is co-created in relationship with our primary caregivers.  According to A. 
N. Schore & Schore (2012): 
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Modern attachment/regulation theory explains how these ‘external’ developmental and 
therapeutic attachment experiences are transformed into ‘internal’ regulatory 
capacities….The intersubjective process of developing a true self that can enter into 
meaningful relationships shows us how the internal world is structured on a 
psychophysiological base… (p. 45). 
It is important to highlight how modern developmental theory differs from Winnicott.  For 
Winnicott, the impetus is on the “mother” to attune with her infant.  Modern developmental 
theory understands attunement or misattunement as resulting from the unique interaction 
between the infant’s biological predisposition (temperament) and its relational environment 
(Schore & Schore, 2012, p. 32).   In the clinical encounter, impasses cannot be explained away as 
a client’s resistance or a therapist’s lack of attunement.  Rather, misattunement in the clinical 
encounter is understood as existing in the intersubjective field between client and therapist.  
In addition to explaining why embodied self-awareness is a necessary attribute of mental 
wellbeing, I have also emphasized that embodied self-awareness is co-created in relationship 
with other embodied beings.  In chapter IV, I described how the infant learns to make sense of its 
feelings and sensations by being in relationship with the primary caregiver.  This same process 
occurs in the therapeutic relationship.  Just as clients learn how to develop their conceptual self-
awareness through being in relationship with a therapist who offers analytic questions and 
interpretations, so too do clients learn how to develop their embodied self-awareness by being in 
relationship with a therapist that encourages deeper awareness of an embodied felt sense of self. 
Embodied Mutual Recognition 
 
In the introduction of this paper I stated that part of what is curative about psychotherapy 
is being recognized in a state of embodied self-awareness by another embodied being.  In chapter 
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III, I reviewed Jessica Benjamin’s (1990, 2004) developmental theory of intersubjectivity as well 
as her understanding of thirdness.  Benjamin explores the paradox of recognition: we depend 
upon the recognition of other subjects in order to become self-conscious of our own independent 
will.  When applied to the clinical context, the client becomes consciously aware of aspects of 
her own subjectivity through a process of mutual recognition with the therapist.  In the very 
moment the client feels her independent subjectivity recognized by the therapist, she is in turn 
recognizing the therapist as a separate subject.  The therapist and client’s separate individual 
subjectivities exist in dialectical tension with the connected intersubjective therapist-client dyad.  
Just as the client becomes conscious of her own subjectivity through a process of mutual 
recognition with the therapist, so the client comes into contact with her embodied subjectivity 
through mutual embodied recognition with the therapist.  To develop embodied self-awareness 
one needs to be recognized by not only another subject but by another embodied subject.  Of 
course from a phenomenological point of view, subjectivity is inherently embodied: we are all 
embodied subjects.  What I am attempting to get at here is something slightly different.    
My proposal is that clients crave to have their embodied self-awareness recognized by an 
embodied other.  I am imagining a client that struggles with embodied self-awareness.  Let’s call 
him Mr. D.  Perhaps Mr. D first came to therapy completely disconnected from his bodily-based 
felt sense of himself.  Mr. D was the type of patient who, when asked about how he was feeling 
would answer by explaining what he was thinking.  Mr. D’s conceptual self-awareness was 
disconnected from his underdeveloped embodied self-awareness.  Mr. D articulated feeling 
inauthentic both inside himself and in relationship with other people, as well as a yearning for 
something intangible that he could not quite grasp.  One might say that Mr. D’s life was made up 
of mostly false self-experiences.    
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Through the process of psychotherapy, as Mr. D began to slowly develop a bodily-based 
felt sense: he was able to perceive sensations in his body that he had previously been unaware of.  
He developed a stronger connection between his conceptual sense of self and his embodied, 
affective sense of self.   In session, when Mr. D has a fleeting experience of being deeply 
connected to his bodily-based felt sense, he longs for his achievement to be recognized by his 
therapist.  Just as Mr. D. looks to his therapist to confirm his conceptual self-awareness by 
recognizing his analytic interpretations of himself, Mr. D. also looks to his therapist to confirm 
and recognize his subjective, embodied sense of self.   
It is as if Mr. D looks to his therapist and through body language and facial expression 
says, “Look at me.  I’m knowing in my bones!”  Through the therapist’s recognition, Mr. D’s 
bodily-based felt sense of his authentic true self-experience is confirmed.  In chapter II, I 
discussed Gendlin’s (1996) description of the felt sense as “a physical sense of something, of 
meaning, of implicit intricacy” (p. 63).   The felt sense is a holistic experience that is more 
complex than affective experience.  It includes emotional experience but is not the same as 
simply being aware of feelings and emotions on an embodied level.  Thus, resonating in mutual 
recognition of a felt sense experience can include affective resonance but it is not the same as 
affective resonance.  
The therapist recognizes Mr. D’s embodied self-awareness by resonating with Mr. D in a 
bodily-based nonverbal somatic third space.  The therapist can verbally recognize Mr. D’s 
embodied self-awareness, but verbal recognition is not necessary.  According to Ben-Shahar 
(2014):  
We may assist clients in building bridges between somatic expression and symbolic 
cognitive and linguistic language, and thereafter process the experience together through 
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verbal interaction.  We may, however, also consent to speak without translators; to 
directly converse with our clients through our own body, without attempting to symbolize 
the expression. (p. 94)   
Regardless of whether or not the embodied attunement is processed verbally, in order to resonate 
with Mr. D in the somatic third space, the therapist must be connected to her internal bodily-
based felt sense of self and willing to feel into the co-created space with Mr. D.  If the therapist is 
stuck in conceptual interpretation, cut off from her bodily-based felt sense, she will not be able to 
resonate with Mr. D on this level, and thus will not be able to recognize him.   
The very moment that Mr. D senses his felt sense of self is being recognized by his 
therapist, he also mutually recognizes his therapist’s separate embodied felt sense of self.  In 
other words, in order for Mr. D to resonate in a state of embodied mutual recognition with his 
therapist, thereby coming in contact with his own embodied subjectivity, Mr. D’s therapist must 
allow herself to be recognized by him on this level.  This requires a great deal of vulnerability on 
the part of the therapist, her subjective embodied, felt sense of self openly displayed to the client.  
Such a moment of embodied mutual recognition is, in the language of the BCSPG (1998b), a 
“moment of meeting.”  It is a surrender to Benjamin’s (2004) shared third encompassing both the 
rhythmic third, the part of the third that constitutes oneness, and the intentional third, the part of 
the third that facilitates differentiation.  It alters the intersubjective field that is the “real 
relationship” and can lead to both new forms of implicit relational knowing and new depths of 
embodied self-awareness.   
To summarize, in order for a client and therapist to resonate in a nonverbal state of 
embodied mutually recognition, both must be attuned to their bodily-based felt sense of self.  
When a client tunes into an embodied felt sense of some truth, they desire to be recognized in 
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their embodied state.  In order to engage in a process of mutual recognition with the client, the 
therapist must allow her felt sense of self to be seen.   
Surrendering to the Third Through Embodied Self-awareness  
 
Benjamin views her ideas on thirdness as an extension of Ghent’s concept of surrender. 
In Benjamin’s (2004) model, we find our way out of complementarity by surrendering to the 
third.  When two people are stuck in opposing positions, finding a third perspective allows the 
relationship to shift.  Discovering the third enables us to open to the other’s reality, even if it 
exists in dialectical tension with our own. Benjamin defines thirdness as an “intersubjective 
mental space.”  For Benjamin, surrendering to the third is the process of freeing oneself from the 
confines of one level of conceptual awareness and opening to another level of conceptual 
awareness.  
I would like to suggest that surrendering to our felt sense is another way of accessing the 
third. When we are stuck in complementary relationships or thinking, we can find a third space 
by surrendering our conceptual self-awareness to our embodied self-awareness.  By sinking into 
our bodily-based felt sense we release ourselves from the confines of our conceptual thinking 
self, the part of us that most likely has become stuck in complementarity, doer-done to relations.  
Recall that the left hemisphere of the brain, the seat of conceptual self-awareness, excels at 
honing in on detail whereas the right hemisphere of the brain, the home of embodied self-
awareness, maintains a broad, holistic perspective.  In the language of interpersonal 
neurobiology, we can surrender left brain explicit processing to right brain implicit processing, 
thereby attempting to find a way to feel-into thirdness.  In this way, thirdness is the 
intersubjective embodied space that facilitates surrender.  Marks-Tarlow (2012) comments, 
“Within the clinical setting, left-brain approaches easily evoke the feeling of ‘being done to’” (p. 
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18).  In other words, we often get locked into complementarity when we get stuck in left-brain, 
analytic, rational, symbolic thinking and relating.  When conceptual relating gets stuck, client, 
therapist, or both can surrender to their embodied self-awareness as a way of finding a third 
perspective.   
I’m imagining a situation in which a therapist, Ms. L, is working with a client whom she 
experiences as dominating and aggressive.  From the beginning, Ms. L is aware of a strong 
countertransferential reaction to this particular client.  During sessions, Ms. L feels as though her 
client speaks at her, barely allowing Ms. L room to speak.  Overtime Ms. L realizes that she feels 
threatened, as though her own subjectivity is being pushed out of the room.  She feels herself 
struggling against her client’s aggression as opposed to moving towards it, and yet she can’t 
seem to change course.  Ms. L is conscious of the fact that she feels stuck in a doer/done to 
dynamic but struggles to find a way out.  It is as if Ms. L has only two options; either continue to 
let the client dominate her or take back control by dominating the client.  Ms. L begins to feel 
frustrated with the client, herself, and the work.    
One way out of such complementarity might be for Ms. L to drop into her felt sense, 
attempting to find the holistic perspective of the right brain.  Ms. L consciously attempts to shift 
from a conceptual awareness of the intersubjective dynamic to an embodied felt sense of the 
intersubjective dynamic.   By making this shift, Ms. L is able to unlock herself from the 
complementarity she has been stuck in.  She feels into the somatic third space searching for other 
ways of being with her client that exist outside of the dominate-or-be-dominated dynamic.  By 
surrendering to her felt sense of self, Ms. L no longer feels the need to defend herself because 
she has found a more holistic, expansive perspective.  She is able to simply be with her client.  
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Ms. L’s shift into embodied self-awareness changes the intersubjective space, is felt by the 
client, and thus enables the therapeutic relationship to find new ground.    
Implications for Clinical Social Work 
 
Viewing clinical practice as ingrained within an embodied intersubjective matrix has 
broad implications for clinical social work.  Throughout this paper I have argued that a paradigm 
shift is currently taking place in the field of psychotherapy: a movement toward a 
reconceptualization of the clinical relationship as both embodied and intersubjective in nature.   
If this is so, it is imperative that clinical social workers are aware of this shifting context.  
The relational-embodied paradigm shift discussed in this paper is deeply compatible with 
social work’s biopsychosocial perspective.  Social work has, historically, emphasized both 
relationship and process as essential attributes of treatment (Brandell & Ringel, 2004).  The 
interconnectedness of body, mind, brain, and relationships is already embedded in the holistic, 
biopsychosocial approach of clinical social work.  Further, the embodied intersubjective context 
is simply an expansion of the person-in-environment perspective, a defining characteristic of 
social work practice.  An embodied intersubjective lens can be easily integrated into a person-in-
environment approach.  This is applicable to both the clinical context and the client’s larger 
sociocultural environment.   
Fogel (2009) notes, “In the global marketplace of ideas and products, a higher value is 
placed on being rational than emotional” (p. 4).  As a culture, we have become disconnected 
from our bodies.  Thinking and doing are valued over feeling and being (Fogel, 2009).  This 
holds true in the vast majority of psychotherapy modalities where left brain cognition is 
encouraged over right brain intuition.  It is thus understandable that many clients, as well as 
therapists, identify almost exclusively with their head-based cognition and are somewhat 
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disconnected from their embodied felt sense of self (Wilberg, 2003).  The field of clinical social 
work, with its biopsychosocial, person-in-environment perspective is positioned to bring 
awareness of this cultural phenomenon into clinical practice.  
In this thesis I did not explore the interconnection between embodied intersubjective 
relating and the social identities of the client/therapist dyad.  I thus specifically chose to not 
include the respective social identities of the client/therapist dyads in the brief fictionalized case 
vignettes in this chapter.  The literature drawn upon in this paper lacks consideration of how the 
meeting of two unique social identities impacts embodied intersubjective relating.  Further 
research is needed that looks at embodied intersubjective relating in, for example, cross-racial, 
cross-gender, and cross-cultural client/therapist dyads.  Clinical social workers have the expertise 
to contribute such research to this area of study.   
Similar to the relational paradigm in psychoanalysis, the field of social work has 
historically remained open to incorporating theory and research from a wide range of related 
fields.  Over the last two decades the field of social work has begun to incorporate theory and 
research from relational psychoanalysis and interpersonal neurobiology (Schore & Schore, 2012, 
p. 28).  This is clearly evident at the Smith School for Social Work where the elective 
Neurobiology and Clinical Social Work has been offered since 2008, The Role of Emotion in 
Therapeutic Action since 2010, Clinical Applications of Intersubjective Theory since 2014, and 
Psychodynamic Relational Perspectives: Implications for Theory and Therapeutic Process 
offered for the first time this year.  The inclusion of these elective courses is encouraging.  
However, it seems as though the body is still curiously left out.  I concur with Shaw’s (2003) 
assertion that it is finally time to bring the body in from the cold.  The field of clinical social 
work has tended to shy away from body psychotherapy due to the controversial issue of touch.  
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Theory and technique from the field of body psychotherapy can assist non-body psychotherapists 
in bringing embodied awareness into the clinical context while remaining far outside the realm of 
physical intimacy.  Therapists can, in Newman’s (2008) words, “help patients move toward an 
organic sense of wholeness, without the use of physical touch, but by ‘touching’ into physical 
experience” (p. 177).   
Social workers need to learn how to attend to both the implicit quality of the client’s 
embodied presentation, as well as their own felt sense while sitting in the room with the client.  
How does the client appear to inhabit his/her body?  Does the client possess a sense of embodied 
self-awareness?  Is the client able to make use of and articulate bodily based sensations and 
feelings?  Is the client’s conceptual self-awareness and embodied self-awareness working 
together or disconnected?  What is the therapist’s felt sense of the intersubjective emotional 
space between herself and the client?  Questions such as these encourage awareness of the 
embodied intersubjective aspects of clinical work.   
Conclusion 
In this paper I attempt to weave together a wide range of literature from interrelated fields 
all endeavoring to understand the nonverbal, implicit, bodily based unconscious intersubjective 
processes of clinical practice. It is my hope that this theoretical exploration, in which I discuss 
the more subtle undercurrents of the therapeutic relationship, inspires further curiosity and 
openness on the part of clinical social workers regarding their own embodied unconscious 
intersubjective processes.   
Stern (2012) asks how we can teach students of psychotherapy the defining attributes and 
clinical intentions of relational work.  He proposes the following answer:  
 82 
What is taught is a focus on process, not on content.  The question is less what things 
mean in the internal, unconscious world than it is an adaptation of Edgar Levenson’s 
(1989) now-famous phrase, ‘What’s going on around here?’  The Therapist-in-training is 
advised to try to feel what is happening, especially the ways in which the relatedness feels 
‘stuck.’ (p. 620).   
A. N. Schore & Schore (2012), in slightly different language, express the same overarching 
sentiment as Stern: 
unconscious nonverbal affective factors more than…conscious verbal cognitive 
factors…[account for] the essential change process of psychotherapy.  Thus, at the most 
essential level, the intersubjective work of psychotherapy is not defined by what the 
therapist does for the patient, or says to the patient (left brain focus).  Rather, the key 
mechanism is how to be with the patient. (p. 44)  
In short, social work training programs need to more directly address the embodied dimension of 
being with the client.  Although specific somatic tools and techniques can and should be taught, 
the theory behind these techniques must also be attended to.  Conceptualizing the clinical 
encounter as taking place in an embodied intersubjective matrix is the first step toward a 
theoretical understanding of how the current paradigm shifts are reformulating the clinical 
context in which we practice.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83 
References 
 
Anderson, F. S. (Ed.).  (2008).  Bodies in treatment: The unspoken dimension.  New York, NY:  
The Analytic Press.   
Aron, L.  (1991).  The patient’s experience of the analyst’s subjectivity.  In S. A.  
Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), Relational psychoanalysis: The emergence of a tradition 
(243-268).  Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1999. 
Aron, L.  (2006).  Analytic impasse and the third: Clinical implications of  
intersubjectivity theory.  International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 87, 349-368.  
doi: 10.1516/15EL-284Y-7Y26-DHRK 
Aron, L. & Anderson, F.S.  (Eds.).  (1998).  Relational perspectives on the body.  Hillsdale, NJ:  
The Analytic Press.   
Aron, L. & Lechich, M. L.  (2012).  Relational psychoanalysis.  In G. O. Gabbard, B. E.  
Litowitz, P. Williams (Eds.), Textbook of psychoanalysis (2nd ed.) (pp. 211-224).  
Arlington, VA, US: American Psychiatric, Inc. 
Benjamin, J.  (1988).  The bonds of love.  New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Benjamin, J.  (1990).  Recognition and destruction: An outline of intersubjectivity.  In S. A.  
Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), Relational Psychoanalysis: the Emergence of a Tradition 
(181-210).  Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1999. 
Benjamin, J.  (2004).  Beyond doer and done to: An intersubjective view of thirdness.   
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73(1), 5-46. 
Benjamin, J.  (2005).  From many into one: Attention, energy, and the containing of multitudes.   
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 15 (2), 185-201.  doi:10.1080/10481881509348826 
Benjamin, J.  (2009).  Psychoanalytic controversies: A relational psychoanalysis  
 84 
perspective on the necessity of acknowledging failure in order to restore the facilitating 
and containing features of the intersubjective relationship (the shared third).  
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 90, 441-450.  doi: 10.1111/j.1745-
8315.2009.00163.x 
Ben-Shahar, A. R.  (2010).  The relational turn and body psychotherapy I.  From ballroom dance  
to five rhythms: An introduction to relational psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.  The 
USA Body Psychotherapy Journal, 9(1), 41-50. 
Ben-Shahar, A. R.  (2011a).  The relational turn and body psychotherapy II.  Something old,  
something new, something borrowed, something blue; Individual selves and dyadic 
selves in relational body psychotherapy.  The USA Body Psychotherapy Journal, 10(1), 
59-68. 
Ben-Shahar, A. R.  (2011b).  The relational turn and body psychotherapy III.  Salsa lessons and  
the emergent self: Somatic organization, relationality, and the place of the self in body-
psychotherapy.  The USA Body Psychotherapy Journal, 10(2), 22-30. 
Ben-Shahar, A. R.  (2012).  The relational turn and body psychotherapy IV.  Gliding on  
the strings that connect us: Resonance in relational body psychotherapy.  International 
Body Psychotherapy Journal: The Art and Science of Somatic Praxis, 11(1), 12-24. 
Ben-Shahar, A. R.  (2014).  Touching the relational edge: Body psychotherapy.  London: Karnac  
 Books Ltd. 
Berzoff, J.  (2011).  Relational and intersubjective theories.  In J. Berzoff, L.M. Flanagan, P.  
Hertz (Eds.), Inside out and outside in: Psychodynamic clinical theory and practice in  
contemporary multicultural contexts (3rd ed.) (222-240).  Maryland, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 85 
Boston Change Process Study Group.  (1998a).  Implicit relational knowing: its role in  
development and psychoanalytic treatment.  Infant Mental Health Journal, 19(3), 282-
289.   
Boston Change Process Study Group.  (1998b).  Non-interpretative mechanisms in  
psychoanalytic therapy: The ‘something more’ than interpretation.  International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 79, 903-921.   
Bowlby, J.  (1969).  Attachment: Attachment and loss vol. 1.  New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Brandell, J. R., & Ringel, S.  (2004).  Psychodynamic perspectives on relationship: Implications  
of new findings from human attachment and the neurosciences for social work education.  
Families in Society, 85(4), 549-556. 
Bromberg, P. M.  (1991).  On knowing one’s patient inside out: The aesthetics of unconscious  
communication.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 1(4), 399-422.  
doi:10.1080/10481889109538911 
Bromberg, P. M.  (2011).  The shadow of the tsunami: and the growth of the relational mind.   
New York, NY: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC. 
Bromberg, P. M.  (2012).  Credo.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 22, 273-278.   
doi:10.1080/10481885.2012.679592 
Campbell, J., & Moyers, B. D.  (1991).  The Power of Myth / Joseph Campbell, With Bill  
Moyers; Betty Sue Flowers, Editor.  New York, NY: Anchor Books, A Division of 
Random House, Inc.  
Carroll, R., & Orbach, S.  (2006).  Contemporary approaches to the body in psychotherapy: Two 
 86 
psychotherapists in dialogue.  In, J. Corrigall, H. Payne, & H. Wilkinson, (Eds.) (2006).  
About a body: Working with the embodied mind in psychotherapy.  New York, NY: 
Routledge.   
Corrigall, J., Payne, H., & Wilkinson, H.  (Eds.) (2006).  About a body: Working with the  
embodied mind in psychotherapy.  New York, NY: Routledge.   
Cozolino, L. J.  (2014).  The neuroscience of human relationships: Attachment and the  
developing social brain.  New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Cozolino, L. J. & Santos, E. N.  (2014).  Why we need therapy – and why it works: A  
neuroscientific perspective.  Smith College Studies in Social Work, 84(2-3), 157-177, 
doi: 10.1080/00377317.2014.923630 
Diamond, N.  (2001).  Towards an interpersonal understanding of bodily experience.   
Psychodynamic Counselling 7(1), 41-62.  doi:10.1080/13533330010018478 
Drisko, J. W. (2004). Common factors in psychotherapy outcome: Meta-analytic findings and  
their implications for practice and research. Families in society: The Journal of 
Contemporary Social Services, 85, 81-90. 
Epstein, M.  (2005).  A strange beauty: Emmanuel Ghent and the psychologies of east  
and west.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 15(2), 125-138.  doi:10.1080/10481881509348820 
Fogel, A.  (2009).  Body sense: The science and the practice of embodied self-awareness.  New  
York: NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.   
Freud, S.  (1923).  The ego and the id.  Standard Edition, 19:3-68.  London: Hogarth Press, 1961. 
 
Frie, R. & Reis, B.  (2001).  Understanding intersubjectivity: Psychoanalytic formulations and  
their philosophical underpinnings.  Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 37, 297-327.  doi: 
10.1080/00107530.2001.10747081 
 87 
Gallese, V., Eagle, M. N., & Migone, P.  (2007).  Intentional attunement: Mirror neurons and the  
neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations.  Journal of American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 55, 131-176.  doi: 10.1177/0003065109339198 
Gendlin, E. T.  (1996).  Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: A manual of the experiential method.   
New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Gerson, S.  (2004).  The relational unconscious: A core element of intersubjectivity, thirdness,  
and clinical process.  The Psychoanalytic Quarterly,73(1), 63-98. 
Ghent, E.  (1989)  Credo – the dialectics of one-person and two-person psychologies.   
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 25, 169-211.  doi:10.1080/10481885.2012.646592 
Ghent, E.  (1990).  Masochism, submission, surrender – masochism as a perversion of surrender.   
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 26, 108-136. 
Ghent, E.  (1992).  Foreward.  In Skolnick, N. J. and Warshaw, S. C. (Eds.),  
Relational perspectives in psychoanalysis (xiii-xxii).  Hillsdale, New Jersey: The 
Analytic Press. 
Ghent, E.  (1995).  Interaction in the psychoanalytic situation.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues  
5(3), 479-491.  doi:10.1080/10481889509539087 
Gill, M. M.  (1994).  Psychoanalysis in transition: A personal view.  Hillsdale, New Jersey:  The  
Analytic Press. 
Greenberg, J. R. & Mitchell, S. A.  (1983).  Object relations in psychoanalytic theory.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Grolnick, S.  (1990).  The work & play of Winnicott.  Northvale, New Jersey: Jason  
Aronson Inc. 
Hay, D.  (2000).  My body, the Buddhist.  Hanover, NH: University Press of New  
 88 
England. 
Hegel, G. W. F.  (1977).  Phenomenology of spirit (A. V. Miller, Trans.).  Oxford, United  
Kingdom: Clarendon Press. (Original work published 1807) 
Hopenwasser, K.  (2008).  Being in rhythm: Dissociative attunement in therapeutic  
process.  Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 9(3), 349-367. 
Hricko, C. A.  (2011).  Whole brain integration in the clinical application of somatic  
experiencing.  The USA Body Psychotherapy Journal, 10(1), 24-28. 
Hubble, A. M., Duncan, B. L., Miller, S. D.  (2000).  Introduction.  In A. M. Hubble, B. L.  
Duncan, & S. D. Miller (Eds.), The heart and soul of change: What works in 
psychotherapy (1-32).  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Knoblauch, S. H.  (2005).  Body rhythms and the unconscious: Toward an expanding of clinical  
attention.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 15(6), 807-827.  doi:10.2513/s10481885pd1506_2 
Kuhn, T.  (1962).  The structure of scientific revolutions.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago  
Press. 
Lachmann, F. M.  (2001).  Some contributions of empirical infant research to adult  
psychoanalysis: What have we learned? How can we apply it?  Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 11(2), 167-185. 
Lichtenberg, J. D.  (2014).  Credo.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 24, 123-128.  doi: 
10.1080/10481885.2014.893751 
Lyons-Ruth, K.  (1999).  The two-person unconscious: Intersubjective dialogue, enactive  
relational representation, and the emergence of new forms of relational organization.  
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19(4), 576-617. 
Marks-Tarlow, T.  (2012).  Clinical intuition in psychotherapy: The neurobiology of  
 89 
embodied response.  New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Marks-Tarlow, T.  (2014).  The interpersonal neurobiology of clinical intuition.  Smith  
College Studies in Social Work, 84, 219-236.  doi: 10.1080/00377317.2014.923712 
Merleau-Ponty, M.  (2012).  Phenomenology of perception.  (D. A. Landes, Trans.).  New York,  
NY: Routledge.  (Original work published 1945). 
Mills, J.  (2005).  A critique of relational psychoanalysis.  Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22 (2),  
155-188. 
Mitchell, S. A.  (1988).  Relational concepts in psychoanalysis: An integration.  Cambridge,  
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 
Mitchell, S. A.  (1992).  True selves, false selves, and the ambiguity of authenticity.   
In Skolnick, N. J. and Warshaw, S. C. (Eds.), Relational perspectives in psychoanalysis 
(1-20).  Hillsdale, New Jersey: The Analytic Press. 
Mitchell, S. A., & Aron, L.  (1999).  Editors Introduction to: Recognition and destruction: An  
outline of intersubjectivity by J. Benjamin.  In S. A. Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), 
Relational Psychoanalysis: the Emergence of a Tradition (181-183).  Hillsdale, NJ: The 
Analytic Press, 1999. 
Mitchell, S. A., Black, M. J.  (1995).  Freud and beyond: A history of modern psychoanalytic  
thought.  Basic Books: New York, NY 
National Association of Social Work’s (2005) Standards for Clinical Social Work in Social  
Work Practice.  (2005).  Retrieved from, 
https://www.socialworkers.org/practice/standards/NASWClinicalSWStandards.pdf 
Newman, H. M.  (2008).  Coming into being: Employing the wisdom of the body and mind-body  
 90 
therapy.  In F. S. Anderson (Ed.), Bodies in treatment: The unspoken dimension (169-
192).  New York, NY: The Analytic Press.   
Nolan, P.  (2014).  The relational field of body psychotherapy.  Body, Movement, and Dance in  
Psychotherapy, 9 (1), 29-40. 
Norcross, J. C. & Grencavage, L. M. (1989). Eclecticism and Integration in counseling and  
psychotherapy: Major themes and obstacles. British Journal of Guidance and 
Counselling. 17: 227-247. 
Ogden, T. H.  (2004).  The analytic third: Implications for psychoanalytic theory and technique.   
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73(1), 167-195. 
Rappaport, E.  (2012).  Creating the umbilical cord: Relational knowing and the somatic  
third.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 22, 375-388.  doi: 10.1080/10481885.2012.679607 
Rappaport, E.  (2015).  Dynamic linking of psyche and soma: Somatic experiencing and  
embodied mentalization.  Manuscript in preparation.   
Schore, A. N.  (2003).  Affect dysregulation & disorders of the self.  New York, NY: W.W.  
Norton & Company. 
Schore, A. N. (2009a).  Relational trauma and the developing right brain: An interface of  
psychoanalytic self psychology and neuroscience.  Self and Systems, 189-203.  doi: 
10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04474.x 
Schore, A. N.  (2009b).  The paradigm shift: The right brain and the relational unconscious.   
Invited plenary address to the American Psychological Association 2009 Convention.  
August 8, Toronto, Canada.  Retrieved from 
http://www.allanschore.com/pdf/SchoreAPAPlenaryFinal09.pdf 
Schore, A. N.  (2012).  The science of the art of psychotherapy.  New York, NY: W.W. Norton  
 91 
& Company. 
Schore, J. R.  (2012).  Using concepts from interpersonal neurobiology in revisiting  
psychodynamic theory.  Smith College Studies in Social Work, 82, 90-111.  doi: 
10.1080/00377317.2012.644494 
Schore, A. N. & Schore, J. R.  (2012).  Modern attachment theory: The central role of affect  
regulation in development and treatment.  In A. N. Schore, The science of the art of 
psychotherapy (pp. 27-51).  New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Schore, J. R., & Schore, A. N.  (2008).  Modern attachment theory: The central role of affect  
regulation in development and treatment.  Clinical Social Work Journal, 36, 9-20.  doi: 
 10.1007/s10615-007-0111-7 
Shaw, R.  (2003).  The embodied psychotherapist: The therapist’s body story.  New York, NY:  
Brunner-Routledge. 
Shaw, R.  (2004).  The embodied psychotherapist: An exploration of the therapists’ somatic  
phenomena within the therapeutic encounter.  Psychotherapy Research, 14(3), 271-288.  
doi:10.1093/ptr/kph025 
Siegel, D. J.  (2001).  Toward an interpersonal neurobiology of the developing mind: Attachment  
relationships, “mindsight,” and neural integration.  Infant Mental Health Journal, 22(1-
2), 67-94.  doi: 10.1002/1097-0355 
Siegel, D. J.  (2012).  Pocket guide to interpersonal neurobiology: An integrative  
handbook of the mind.  New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Stern, D. B.  (2009).  Partners in thought: A clinical process theory of narrative.  Psychoanalytic  
Quarterly, 78, 701-731.  doi: 10.1002/j.2167-4086.2009.tb00410.x 
Stern, D. B.  (2012).  Being with Andres: Commentary on paper by Ellen F. Fries.   
 92 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 22(5), 616-622.  doi: 10.1080/10481885.2012.719452 
Stolorow, R. D.  (2013).  Intersubjective-systems theory: A phenomenological-contextualist  
psychoanalytic perspective.  Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 23, 383-389.  doi: 
10.1080/10481885.2013.810486. 
Stolorow, R. D. & Atwood, G. E.  (1992).  Contexts of being: The intersubjective foundations of  
psychological life.  Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. 
Stone, M.  (2006).  The analyst’s body as tuning fork: Embodied resonance in  
countertransference.  Journal of Analytical Psychology, 51, 109-124.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-5922.2006.575_1.x 
Strait, J. R.  (2014).  Resonance in the dissociative field: Examining the therapist’s internal  
experience when a patient dissociates in session.  Smith College Studies in Social Work, 
84(2-3), 310-331, doi: 10.1080/00377317.2014.923721. 
Tannen, T. & Daniels, H. M.  (2010).  Counselor presence: Bridging the gap between 
 wisdom and new knowledge.  British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 38 (1),  1-15. 
Totton, N. (2003).  Body psychotherapy: An introduction.  London, England: Open University  
Press. 
Wilberg, P.  (2003).  Soma-psychology and soma-sensitivity: A missing dimension of  
mental health care.  Retrieved from, http://www.thenewyoga.org/soma.htm 
Winnicott, D. W. (1965).  The maturational processes and the facilitating environment:  
Studies in the theory of emotional development.  London, England: The Hogarth Press. 
Wylie, M. S.  (2004).  The limits of talk: Bessel Van der Kolk wants to transform the treatment  
of trauma.  Psychotherapy Networker Magazine.  Retrieved from,  
 93 
http://www.psychotherapynetworker.org/magazine/populartopics/trauma/485-the-limits-
of-talk 
Young, C.  (2006).  One hundred and fifty years on: The history, significance and scope of body  
psychotherapy today.  In J. Corrigall, H. Payne, & H. Wilkinson (Eds.), About a body: 
Working with the embodied mind in psychotherapy (pp. 83-94).  New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Zucker, S.  (2014).  Voices of experience: The mental health consumer and psychiatric  
survivor movements and their implications for ethical clinical practice (Master’s thesis).  
Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11020/24520 
 
 
 
